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Charles Taylor, *The Secular Age*
Reading Notes

Introduction

1. *What does is mean to say that we live in a secular age?* [italic titles are Evan's construction. Taylor only has numbers]
   (1) institutions and practices (esp. state)
   (2) falling off belief
   (3) conditions of belief (and this is what Taylor is addressing in this book)
2. *Secularity as a Condition of Experience*
   • situating the place of fullness, absence, middle condition; the meaning of meaning
   • Christian and non-Christian formulations of this
       ◦ rational, non-rational, post-modern rejection

12, "Now in this regard, there has been a titanic change in our western civilization. We have changed not just from a condition where most people lived "naively in a construal (part Christian, part related to "spirits" of pagan origin) as simple reality, to one in which almost no one is capable of this, but all see their option as one among many. We all learn to navigate between two standpoints: an "engaged" one in which we live as best we can the reality our standpoint opens us to; and a "disengaged" one in which we are able to see ourselves as occupying one standpoint among a range of possible ones, with which we have in various ways to coexist."

14, "It is this shift in background, in the whole context in which we experience and search for fullness, that I am calling the coming of a secular age in my third sense."

3. *Religion*
15, "In other words, a reading of "religion" in terms of the distinction transcendent/immanent is going to serve our purposes here."

most important is the "beyond's" relationship to "some good higher than, beyond human flourishing." (20)

4. *The New Context, Setting the Stage*
21, "The crucial change which brought us into this new condition was the coming of exclusive humanism as a widely available option."
   • The West
   • Taylor's refutation of "subtraction stories"

22, "Concisely put, I mean by this stories of modernity in general, and secularity in particular, which explain them by human beings having lost, or sloughed off, or liberated themselves from certain earlier, confining horizons, or illusions, or limitations of knowledge. What emerges from this process-- modernity or secularity--is to be understood in terms of underlying features of human nature which were there all along, but had been impeded by what is now set aside. Against this kind of story, I will

steadily be arguing that Western modernity, including its secularity, is the fruit of new inventions, newly constructed self-understandings and related practices, and can't be be explained in terms of perennial features of human life."

PART ONE: THE WORK OF REFORM

Chapter 1. The Bulwarks of Belief

1. Introducing Disenchantment

Places within which God was manifestly obvious in pre-modernity
>   (1) the natural world testified to divine purpose
>   (2) implicated in the existence of society
>   (3) people lived in an "enchanted" world - spirits, demons, moral forces

26, "And so the story I have to tell will relate not only how God's presence receded in these three dimensions; it also has to explain how something other than God could become the necessary objective pole of moral or spiritual aspiration, of "fullness."

27, "A crucial condition for this was a new sense of the self and its place in the cosmos: not open and porous and vulnerable to a world of spirits and powers, but what I want to call "buffered". But it took more than disenchantment to produce the buffered self; it was also necessary to have confidence in our own powers of moral reasoning."

28, "it came to be in a series of phases, emerging out of earlier Christian forms. This is the story I'm going to try to tell."

2. Why the Need for History

3. Broad Features of the Contrast (then and now) [for his structure, see p. 29.7f]

I. *Disenchantment* (buffered vs. porous self) [cf. (1) above]
32, "in the enchanted world, meanings are not in the mind in this sense"
32, "in the enchanted world, the line between personal agency and impersonal force was not at all clearly drawn." (relics, events, people, spirits . . .)
33, "the enchanted world, in contrast to out universe of buffered selves and "minds", shows a perplexing absence of certain boundaries which seem to us essential. . . .
34, "But in the enchanted world, the meaning in things also includes another power. These "charged" objects . . ." - causal power
36, "vulnerable or "healable"" to benevolence or malevolence - propitiate
39, "Yet another clear boundary of today, that between the laws of physical science and the meanings things have for us, is also not respected."

4. How earlier society held the tensions [II. cf. (2) above]

43, "The social bond at all these levels was intertwined in the sacred, and indeed, it was unimaginable otherwise."
>   The existence of society itself speaks of God.

III. *How societies held tensions in equilibrium* [he begins to speak of monasticism here]
- religious vocations
- sacraments
- hierarchical complimentarity - clergy pray for all, lords defend all, peasants labour for all
- Carnival - primitive chaos moments and rituals of reversal (48), need for anti-structure

50, "Seen from this point of view, the eclipse of this felt need is a simple corollary of the secularization of public space (sense 1 of the first chapter above). [new par.] "I draw attention to it here, because I think that it played a very important role in the rise of secularity 1. That is, it was the eclipse of this sense of necessary complementarity, of the need for anti-structure, which preceded and helped to bring about the secularization of public space."

difference between Carnival and revolution. The nature of anti-structure

5. On Time (=IV)

54, "In the pre-modern era, the organizing field for ordinary time came from what I want to call higher times." *saeculum*
- Plato eternity - perfect immobility, impassivity
- God's eternity - time gathered into an instant
- time of origins or Great Time - popular idea

in modernity - (58) "time like space has become a container, indifferent to what fills it." indifferent and linear

59, "This is another of the great shifts, along with disenchantment, and the eclipse of anti-structure, which have helped to set the conditions for modern secular society."

59, "But important as science is to our present outlook, we mustn't exaggerate its causal role here . . . social and ideological changes . . . We have constructed an environment in which we live a uniform, univocal secular time, which we try to measure and control in order to get things done."

V. *Cosmos*
59, "We might say that we moved from living in a cosmos to being included in a universe."
60, "the cosmos idea faded, and we find ourselves in a universe. . . . But it is no longer a hierarchy of being, and it doesn't obviously point to eternity as the locus of its principle of cohesion."

6. How comes disenchantment - Reform era

Summary this far (61), "I have been drawing a portrait of the world we have lost, one in which spiritual forces impinged on porous agents, in which the social was grounded in the sacred and secular time in higher times, a society moreover in which the play of structure and anti-structure was held in equilibrium; and this human drama unfolded within a cosmos. All this has been dismantled and replaced by something quite different in the transformation we often roughly call disenchantment."

How did this arise? - many causes

Drive to Reform - lay life and renunciative vocations [monasticism again]
63, "But what is peculiar to Latin Christiandom is a growing concern with Reform, a drive to make over the whole society to higher standards. I don't pretend to have the explanation of this "rage for

order", but it seems to me to be a fact about the late-medieval and early modern period, and moreover one which has carried over into the modern period in the partly secularized ideal of "civilization". I want to argue that this "rage" has been crucial to the destruction of the old enchanted cosmos, and to the creation of a viable alternative in exclusive humanism."

growth of lay devotions, gap in hierarchy becomes smaller
- popular Christocentric spirituality
- concerted effort to raise standards
- attitude toward death (and judgment)

67-68, "In the later Middle Ages, the church begins to give currency to the idea that each individual will face as well his/her own judgment, imme- //diately on their death."

68, As Delumeu puts it: "mépris du monde, dramatisation de la mort et insistance sur le salut personnel ont émergé ensemble." [EH - I think this developed in the 11th century ff. move toward the *vita apostolica*, and later in the Sisters and Brothers of the Common Life (and others). The Protestant Reformation was an appropriate further consequence of these earlier developments]

mobility and breakup of earlier communal forms of life (cf. Taylor's references to Bossy)

Taylor's take on Late Medieval Religion: Decline or Development (pp. 72-75)
- gap between education minorities and mass practice

Two factors that drove people to reject church magic
- the social dimension - hierarchical church
- reversal of the field of fear - God over all magic

74-75, "In a sense, the stage seems set for the Reformation . . . . // But their was one big element missing; and that was the doctrine of salvation by faith."

7. Disenchantment and Humanism

Summary (75-76), "So there were strong urges for religious renewal, on at least three axes I have been describing: the turn to a more inward and intense personal devotion, a greater // uneasiness at "sacramentals" and a church-controlled magic, and then latterly the new inspiring idea of salvation by faith, which erupted into a world riven with anxiety about judgment and a sense of unworthiness."

place of rage, problem with the sacred [more on monasticism on 77]

77, "The Reformation as Reform is central to the story I want to tell--that of the abolition of the enchanted cosmos, and the eventual creation of a humanist alternative to faith. The first consequence seems evident enough; the Reformation is known as an engine of disenchantment. The second is less obvious, and more indirect. - see Calvin [EH - I will let scholars greater than I critique his interpretation of Calvin, but . . .]
- First, disenchantment (see 79), "So we disenchant the world; we reject sacramentals; all the elements of "magic" in the old religion. They are not only useless, but blasphemous, because they are arrogating power to us, and hence "plucking" it away "from the glory of God's righteousness."
  - reject everything which smacks of idolatry
  - feel a new freedom in a world shorn of the sacred
- The rise of humanism - drive to re-order society in all dimensions; yet different "speeds"
  - [EH - the elitism question]

81, "So there seems to be a dilemma here, between demanding too much renunciation from the ordinary person, on one hand, and relaxing these demands, but at the cost of a multi-speed system, on the other."

order and disorder

82, "But in view of the importance now given to social order, the generalization of moral demands involved not only placing high moral demands on one's life, but also putting order into society."
Three levels of order
- personal conduct
- society
- inner stance (right inner attitude)

83, "Now both their action in expelling the sacred from worship and social life, and the instrumental stance they take to things and to society in the course of building their order, tends to drive out the enchantment from the world."

84, "We can see how from this confidence in our capacity to achieve the three-fold order, a move to an exclusive humanism could be made. What is required is that the reference to God be lopped off at two points."
- goal of order defined as merely human flourishing
- power to pursue it is a purely human capacity

8. The Larger Sixteenth Century - summarizing changes within 1450-1650

(1) autonomous changes in popular piety
(2) new élites with different perspectives and social base
(3) deliberate attempts by these élites to make over the whole society

[EBH] – interesting to see how all of these are present in the shift from late antiquity to medieval

made by ecclesiastical élites, but then also be others and secular authorities
86 [example], "Charles Borromeo, the great counter-Reformation bishop of Milan, both carried out a reform of many church practices in keeping with more advanced models: condemning carnivals, and other vestiges of paganism, which mix sacred and profane, trying to exclude animals from churches, end dancing in cemeteries, ban charivaris, etc.; in short, establish a more ordered and less "enchanted" version of Christian practice; and he also encouraged municipal measures to organize and discipline the poor and vagabonds."
- activist
- uniformizing
- homogenizing
- rationalizing (cf. Weber)   [88, "and of course by its hostility to enchantment and equilibrium]
87, "This, plus the inherent drive of the religious reformations, made them work together towards the disenchantment of the world,. . . ."
denial of ambiguity and perplexity, split between élite and popular culture

Summary (88) - "Ideally, we should be able to follow the whole process of re-ordering in its different facets, the two reformations and the "police state". But before this, we have to describe some of the background to the lay attempts at Reform. - philosophical concepts of nature, development of humanism

9. The Concentration of the Demons

context of the age of anxiety

88, "In a sense, the demons get concentrated, even as the positive energy of God is concentrating out of its dispersal in charged objects and church magic. There is one enemy, THE devil. Satan."

increase of struggle, intensification of persecution of the marginals

89, "The hypothesis is that there was more free-floating anxiety, really about one's own salvation; and so more likelihood that people would react violently to pollution threats to what they dimly saw as bulwarks in the social sacred against whatever menaces arose." return to this towards end of book.

Chapter 2. The Rise of the Disciplinary Society

note – A strong part of Taylor's aim here is to provide evidence that essential features of "modern" culture (appreciation of nature as nature, self-control and civility, ordered society . . .) are not developments of a simply "subtractionist" nature – God fades away and secular values develop. Rather these essential features emerge in the context of a rethinking of *Christian* perspectives.

1. Development of a New Interest in Nature

90, The subtraction theory Taylor is arguing against: ". . . they take more and more interest in nature-for-its-own-sake, and gradually this will grow, while the reference to the divine atrophies. Until finally, they are modern exclusive humanists, or at least secularists."

91, "This seems to me to be wrong" . . . "This is what I want to contest," (92), "my claim would be that the meanings involving reference to God played a very important role [in the rediscovery of nature]"

painting and sculpture; monastic interest in forms of *vita apostolica* in the world; devotion to the human Christ [EBH - 12th cen renaissance]; value of the individual, "individual form" (Scotus)

94, "It was primarily a revolution of devotion, in the focus of prayer and love: the paradigm human individual, the God-Man, in relation to whom alone the humanity of all the others can be truly known, begins to emerge more into the light.
        And so it seems to be no mere coincidence that one of the first reflections of this focus in painting should have been Giotto's murals in the church at Assisi."

94, two motives for the renewed interest in nature as autonomous:
   • devotion to God as the creator of an ordered cosmos
   • new evangelical turning to the world
note the significance of the O.P here (95), "The travelling friars were in a sense media of communication, through which a more vivid social imaginary of linkage could grow among ordinary people, until the invention of printing intensified the process many fold in a quantum leap." [EBH – post and mid-crusades as well – penitents as networks of outrage and hope]

95, "the new interest in nature was not a step outside of a religious outlook, even partially; it was a mutation within this outlook. The straight path account of modern secularity can't be sustained. Instead, what I'm offering here is a zig-zag account, one full of unintended consequences."

development of perspective in painting -

coherence of space – *and time* (cf. Earlier – unchanging realm of essences, eternity of God, origins)

also nominalist revolution and question of essences (97), "The framework, the meaning of being, is relative no just to a vision of the world, but also to an understanding of the stance of the agent in the world."

98, "No this, of course, is at first in the service of God's purposes; but the shift will not be long in coming to a new understanding of being, according to which, all intrinsic purpose having been expelled, final causation drops out, and efficient causation alone remains."

98, "Not just on a level of popular belief, as a world of spirits, do we have to disenchant the universe; we also have to bring about the analagous shift on the high cultural level of science, and trade in a universe of ordered signs, in which everything has a meaning, for a silent but beneficent machine."

what we are doing when we do science – constructing ordered thought
        but not just science, also ethics

2. The Ethics of Civility

99, "A crucial strand in this story starts from the Renaissance notion of civility." - civilization vs. savages in the forest

mode of government – orderly fashion, code of law, domestic peace (100), "This reflected the transition that European societies were going through from about 1400."

[EBH], - we can sense the beginning of this shift toward order in the 12th century renaissance, and in a distinctly Christian environment

101, "Ordered government was one facet of civility. But there were others. They included a ertain development of the arts and sciences, what we would call today, technology (here again, like our 'civilization'). It included the development of rational moral self-control; and also, crucially, taste, manners, refinement; in short, sound education and polite manners."   vs. warfare culture

101, "Civility requires working on yourself, not just leaving things as they are, but making them over. It involves a struggle to reshape ourselves."   [EBH – the modern ascetic]

The pro-active stance toward reform – Why? Complex.
- (negative) Disorder threatened the elite (poor laws . . .) background of population changes . . .
- (positive) Essential part of statecraft – state facilitates economy which forms a root of military power
- (another fear) Religious element (note civility and religious reform combined in practice)
- (positive) Public order – again with religious undertone,

104, "Religious Reform, as I argued above, was inhabited by a demand, felt with increasing power during the late Middle Ages and the early modern period, that not just an élite, but as far as possible all the faithful live up to the demands of the Gospel." . . . "Everyone was called on to live their faith to the full. And this meant that the lives and practices of ordinary people couldn't just be left as they were. They had to be exhorted, commanded, and sometimes forced and bullied into giving up, e.g., the veneration of saints, the adoration of the Sacrament, dancing around the maypole, and so on."

104, point is that religious reform influences secular reform, "It should not be surprising if some sense of an obligation to universalize, which surrounded the religious reform, should rub off onto secular reform."

105, "But in spite of this, it is hard to argue that it follows inescapably from Christian faith that the Godly have a duty to take over and bring things into line. Minority for minority, mediaeval monks took a somewhat different position."

Yet some groups (e.g. Calvinists) saw something (105), "In other words, the good order of civility, and the good order of piety, didn't remain in separate uncommunicating compartments. They to some extent merged and inflected each other."

105, "The drive to piety, to bring all real Christians . . . up to the fully Godly life, inflects the agenda of social reform, ... And the demands of civility, which entailed some reordering of society, in turn give a new social dimension to the pious, ordered life." - example of Jan Łąski (16th)

106, "This global agenda was perhaps more in evidence in Calvinist societies, and was at its most marked among Puritans of late-sixteenth and seventeenth-century England and America." - saint as a pillar of a new social order, the good were to rule; the unregenerate were to be kept in check (107), "Spiritual recovery and the rescue of civil order go together."

108, "Their tolerance for what they see as disorder, rowdiness, uncontrolled violence diminishes." five types of programmes:

1. poor laws - "shift in the whole register in which poverty is understood"
2. governments and church authorities hard on certain elements of popular culture
3. absolutist or dirigiste bent – spread influence of 1 and 2 further (e.g. schools . . .) - civility to a wider strata
4. government with right spirit and discipline (e.g. Prussia)
5. "methods" and procedures – meditation directed by method (*Spiritual Exercises*)

3. Neo-Stoicism (self-fashioning and Christianity)

emphasis on will, on self-fashioning imposition of form on matter

113, "Two modes of poiesis, the reconstructive stance in ethics and an instrumental rather than a contemplative understanding of science, lent each other mutual support."

philosophical view (113), "If God has a potentia absoluta over Creation, and this mean[s – sic] that he cannot be seen as bound by the inherent bent, even of things he has created in the first place, then reality must be seen as infinitely manipulable by him, and this requirement can best be met by a view

of nature as a mechanism, from which all hint of teleology has been expelled." - thus emphasis on efficient causality

various sources of the drive to reconstruction

Justus Lipsius – "the most influential neo-Stoic writer of the sixteenth century" - a sort-of Christianized Stoicism. VERY INFLUENTIAL – why?
- More concerned with broad faith that can share basic elements
- Lipsius' readers wanted to build a new political order

117, "Lipsius' view was at its core theistic; and his God was not presiding over the benign, harmonious universe of the eighteenth-century Deism. But the eclipse of certain crucial Christian elements, those of grace and of agape, already changed quite decisively the centre of gravity of this outlook." . . . "Neo-Stoicism is the zig to which Deism will be the zag."

view of politics and leadership. . .
118-19, "In short, something like what has been called the "protestant work ethic", in an atmosphere comparable to the "inner-worldly asceticism" (innerweltliche Askese) of // which Max Weber talked, was to be created, but very much through the active, reconstructive efforts of political authority. It may indeed, be argued that this ethic of active state intervention, in the period of absolute governments, did as much to introduce a rationalized, disciplined, an professionalized mode of life as the Calvinist ethic of the calling."

also the belief that all this could be accomplished [EBH – a civilization-wide growth mind-set]

119, "Plainly there has been a major change in outlook. The Middle Ages seems steeped in the view, which has probably been the way that people in most ages have seen this question, that there are severe limits to the degree in which sin and disorder can be done away with in this world." - not so in modernity – [EBH] - ressourcement

everyone included – (120), "An ambition of this kind is unprecedented in European history."
- Calvin looked back to early church
- Lipsius to Roman Empire
- others – early republican Rome or Greek
"So where did they get the confidence to enter this uncharted terrain?"
- Augustine's two cities and elect more numerous [moral majority]
- change of understanding of society and relation to evil (from e.g. three orders and "air hole" to potential for order – natural order)
125, "But in the climate of thought which was influenced by neo-Stoicism, a new idea developed, a conception of natural order, which seemed to offer a basis for hope in a reformed world." Natural Law

Grotius (follower of Lipsius) and his concept of natural law

127, "I mention these, because we have to bear in mind that order drawn from natural law had rivals, which were also designed to meet the critical conditions of religious strife, and give a basis to the state's reconstructive activity. We have forgotten, because the losers tend to slip out of sight in history, but the most prominent answer in seventeenth-century Europe to the disorder of religious war was the absolute state." - divine right of kings, normative order .. .

129, "And so what emerges out of this reflection on Natural Law is the norm of a stable order of industrious men in the settled courses of their callings, dedicating themselves to growth and prosperity, rather than war and plunder, and accepting a morality of mutual respect and an ethic of self-improvement." - rational, God-given way of living

130, "This was the predicament, marked by a sense of order achieved, a feeling that the powers of reconstruction had been successfully exercised, in which anthropocentrism could flourish, and the conditions were created at last in which a live option of exclusive humanism could emerge from the womb of history."

4. Neo-Stoicism and Descartes

130, "But before turning to this [the development of exclusive humanism], I want to double back and examine how some of the bases for this humanism emerged out of the neo-Stoic tradition."

130, "Neo-Stoicism in Lipsius' formulation had already departed from the original model, as we saw [p. 113f]: in its emphasis on the will. And in its mind/body dualism. Descartes pushes further along these lines of departure, and develops a quite different view."

ethic grounded in reality vs. ethic imposed by will – Descartes eliminates possibility of first norm of detachment - control by reason (133), "Not conflict-free harmony, but struggled-for domination is now the acme of virtue."

134, "The rank I must live up to is the non-socially-defined one of rational agent. . . . In other words, the central place, the virtue which can uphold and sustain the others, which Socrates gave to wisdom, for instance, and others have given to temperance, for Descartes falls to generosity. The key motivation here is the demands laid on me by my own status as a rational being, and the satisfaction is that of having lived up to the dignity of this station." - move to intrinsic self-worth (not place in cosmos) . . . "A crucial element of the coming exclusive humanism is in place." [note – without yet displacing God at all]

135, "The buffered self is the agent who no longer fears demons, spirits, magic forces. More radically, these no longer impinge; they don't exist for him; whatever threat or other meaning they proffer doesn't "get to" him. Now the disengaged rational agent carries out an analogous operation on desire."

reminder that we will address Romanticism ahead. Yet, the point is that (136), "within this identity of disengaged reason, disenchantment, and instrumental control go closely together. And it was this which helped prepare the ground for the new option of exclusive humanism."

5. Civilizing Ourselves

136, "This disengaged, disciplined stance to self and society has become part of the essential defining repertoire of the modern identity. It is also a central feature of secularity 3 [condition of belief – cf. Chap 1]."

Second facet of buffered self
  • disenchantment involves boundaries with relation to world (less porous)
  • also boundaries with relation to self (kindred to warrior ethic)
shift in manners and etiquette . . . (developing the insights of Norbert Elias)

140, "Indeed, we can say that what we can mean by intimacy changes profoundly at this time." . . . (141), "The new companionate marriage and the family it creates requires a privacy which earlier ages didn't seek, just because it is the locus of shared sentiment, which is now understood to be an important human good, for many, an essential part of a full human life."

141, "Our ancestors permitted themselves accesses of rage, they more frankly gloried in violence, they flocked to scenes of cruel punishment, inflicted on humans and animals; all things that tend to horrify us today. These things too, as well as bodily intimacy, have been strongly suppressed. It is not just that we tend to control our anger better, or at least to demand this of each other; we also learn to damp our feelings of rage and resentment." . . . television, fiction . . . [EBH – and in a post-modern society? "Fight Club" and so on]

142, "Civilization is in a sense a matter of feeling shame in the appropriate places." good further discussion following this sentence on buffered self-and

6. Prologue to the Shift to Exclusive Humanism

142-43, "But before proceeding [in giving account of the shift], I want to pause and put the whole // sweep of things in another framework, which sheds important light on it. . . . A way of putting our present condition is to say that many people are happy living for goals which are purely immanent; they live in a way that takes no account for the transcendent."   2 stage account:
   - First – distinguish natural (immanent) and supernatural (transcendent) – cf. high Middle Ages; but more importantly a sorting out in experience. A dis-enchantment (spirits . . .)
   - Second – a drive to see and acknowledge God more present in everyday life (realism in painting, incarnation . . .)

143, "But this was at first compatible with a continuing belief in God. Indeed, it was accompanied by a more conscious and zealous dedication to God."

145, "And so more than one vector in Western Christendom contributed to the cut between immanence and transcendence; not just the rage for order which was implicit in much more intense piety, and whose drive to disenchantment is clear; but also the need to make God more fully present in everyday life and all its contexts, which led people to invest these contexts with a new significance and solidity.
        The irony is that just this, so much the fruit of devotion and faith, prepares the ground for an escape from faith, into a purely immanent world. Just how this happens is the subject of the following chapters."

Chapter 3 – The Great Disembedding

we have seen the development among important élites of buffered identity, impervious to the enchanted cosmos – society

[EBH] – Again, we address the question of identity. Identity as a "form of life" emerging from our constructed sense of our relationships to:
   - world=cosmos (spirits, God, nature . . .)
   - world=society (social order, castes and roles . . .)
   - inner self

New Order developed in the modern shift (146), "the compromise between the individuated religion of devotion or obedience or rationally understood virtue, on one hand, and the collective often cosmos-related rituals of whole societies, on the other, was broken, and in favour of the former. Disenchantment, Reform, and personal religion went together. . . . This involved the growth and entrenchement of a new self-understanding of our social existence, one which gave an unprecedented primacy to the individual."

[EBH] – I need to think more and more about the various "individualist" "collectivist" categories historians and others claim for different periods of time. I see individualism in the search for salvation that preceeds Christianity in the Hellenist religions, in the ancient desert ascetical traditions, in the medieval drive to donate for the sake of one's salvation and in many other elements that are characteristic of these pre-modern societies. Family in some pre-modern eras was not the intimate companionate community ideal of today. I also see corporate, embeddedness in different forms throughout history. Is there really a simple gap between pre-modern *communitarianism* and modern *individualism*?

Dealing with social imaginary – (147), "But first, I want to place the revolution in our imaginary of the last few centuries in the broader sweep of cultural-religious development, as this has generally come to be understood." (exploring small-scale societies – cf. Bellah on "early religion") - we note how profoundly these forms of life "embed" the agent:
  • First, socially – religious life linked with social life, ubiquity of spirits; primary agency of social group as a whole; collective ritual action; entrenchment of inequality and such

149-50, "What I'm calling social embedddness is thus partly an identity thing. From the standpoint of the individual's sense of self, it means the inability to imagine oneself // outside a certain matrix" (and ask questions of "emigrate," convert to different religion . . .)

[EBH] – I wonder. Taylor's analysis is good for the shift from late medieval to modern. But in the poly-ethnicity and poly-religiousity of Greek and Roman antiquity I think that you can see a similar (perhaps) distancing of the self from the embeddedness of culture. It is for this very reason that Christian exclusivism was perceived as so dangerous in Roman society and got Christians labeled as atheists.

  • Second, embedded in cosmos – spirits, forces . . .
  • Third, sense of human flourishing

[EBH] – Again, I wonder. Hellenistic religions? Early medieval developed sense of eternal judgment . . .?

change in views of transcendent (single, distant) and the Good (salvation out there) – consequently change in perception of evil (not just part of the order of things; "something has to be done about it")

the change process – not all at once

154, "In all these cases, there is some kind of hiatus, difference, or even break in relation to the religious life of the whole larger society."

155, "This project was thoroughly disembedding just by virtue of its form or mode of operation: the disciplined remaking of behaviour and social forms through objectification and an instrumental stance.

But its ends were also intrinsically concerned to disembed. . . . But my thesis is that the effect of the Christian, or Christian-Stoic, attempt to remake society in bringing about the modern "individual in the world" was much more pervasive, and multitracked. It helped to nudge first the moral, then the social imaginary in the direction of modern individualism."

disembedding both a matter of identity and social imaginary

157, "On the contrary, what we propose here is the idea that our first self-understanding was deeply embedded in society. Our essential identity was as father, son, etc., and member of this tribe. Only later did we come to conceive ourselves as free individuals first. This was not just a revolution in our neutral view of ourselves, but involved a profound change in our moral world, as is always the case with identity shifts. . . . So the great disembedding occurs as a revolution in our understanding of moral order. And it goes on being accompanied by ideas of moral order."

[EBH] – Is this what the early monks/nuns were renouncing when they left for the desert, or when Jesus' disciples left "houses or brothers or sisters or father or mother or wife or children or fields" (Matthew 19:29)? What is the relationship of social imaginary and renunciation in pre-modern, modern, and post-modern societies?   Also – Isn't the idea of individual rights and contract theory [just] a new form of "re-embedding" such that, while the aim points toward the both individuals and common good, there is actually greater ownership of the group through mutual responsibility for direction of the whole, as opposed to unequal representation?

The Great Disembedding powered by Christianity and a "corruption" of it – not agape, but disciplined society (158), "But it nevertheless all started by the laudable attempt to fight back the demands of the "world," and then make it over." Investiture controversy

158, natural to then want to improve world, but to impose it? Yet "world" won after all – temptation of power.

Chapter 4 – Modern Social Imaginaries   (see Taylor's *Modern Social Imaginaries*, 2004).

1. The Modern Moral Order

159, "I will start with the new vision of moral order, which I claim played a central role in the development of modern Western society." theories of Natural Law

Grotius and Locke

159, Grotius - "Human beings are rational, sociable agents who are meant to collaborate in peace to their mutual benefit." . . . "But any theory of this kind also offers inescapably an idea of moral order. It tells us something about how we ought to live together in society."

natural rights, common benefits (security), contract theory, Locke and taxation . . .

160, "In the next three centuries, from Locke to our day, although the contract language may fall away, and we used only by a minority of theorists, the underlying idea of society as existing for the (mutual) benefit of individuals, and the defense of their rights, takes on more and more importance." . . . today . . . "The presumption of equality, implicit in the starting point of the State of Nature, where people stand outside of all relations of superiority and inferiority, has been applied in more and more contexts,

ending with the multiple equal treatment or non-discrimination provisions, which are an integral part of most entrenched charters."

idea of natural law starts in one place and spreads

161, "Even more important to our lives today is the manner in which this idea of order has become more and more central to our notions of society and polity, remaking them in the process. And in the course of this expansion, it has moved from being a theory, animating the discourse of a few experts, and become integral to our social imaginary, that is, the way in which our contemporaries imagine the societies they inhabit and sustain."

[EBH] this page discusses monasticism and "how high the bar"
minority of saints, king's two bodies

162, "Thus while moving from one niche to many, and migrating from theory into social imaginary, the modern idea of order also travels on a third axis [from "out there" to here-and-now], and the discourses it generates are strung out along the path from the hermeneutic to the prescriptive."

163, "In other words the image of order not only carries a definition of what is right, but of the context in which it makes sense to strive for, and hope to realize the right (at least partially)."

Two types of pre-modern order which are overcome in the modern:
• Law of a people (from forever)
• hierarchy in society which corresponds to hierarchy in cosmos-related

164, "It is therefore tempting to think that our modern notions of moral order lack altogether an ontic component. But this would be a mistake, as I hope to show later. There is an important difference, but it lies in the fact that this component is now a feature about humans, rather than one touching God or the cosmos, and not in the supposed absence altogether of an ontic dimension."

e.g. three orders in medieval [EBH] – also castes in India . . . (165), "The modern idealization of order departs radically from this" . . . good defined instrumentally. . . no essential worth, "In other words, the basic point of the new normative order was the mutual respect and mutual service of the individuals who make up society. The actual structures were meant to serve these ends, and were judged instrumentally in this light."

Differences from Platonic idea of order:
• Form no longer at work in reality
• distribution of functions is not itself normative
• not bringing to highest virtue, but instrumental, ordinary aims

currently security and prosperity

Locke – (167), In contrast to the theories of hierarchical complementarity, we meet in a zone of concord and mutual service, not to the extent that we transcend our ordinary goals and purposes, but on the contrary, in the process of carrying them out according to God's design."

out of synch in the way things actually worked in reality

[EBH] and from mutual service to network now? How do we account for the differences (a la Castells and after)

complex steps moving forward in modern social arrangements

169, "What is rather surprising is that it was possible to win through modern individualism; not just on the level of theory, but also transforming and penetrating the social imaginary."

The main features of this modern understanding of moral order (170-71):
(1) Theory of rights and legitimate rule – political society as an instrument for something pre-political (agents)
(2) As instrument it serves mutual individual attainment of security and prosperity (life)
(3) Begins with free (buffered, disciplined) individuals – aim [as well as agency] is freedom
(4) Secured to all participants equally
171, "These are the crucial features, the constants that recur in the modern idea of moral order, through its varying "redactions"."

2. What is a "Social Imaginary"?

Ways in which they imagine their social existence. - from theory to imaginary, expectations, implicit grasp of a social space

[EBH], again, interesting to think here about the changes in a new network/social media-saturated social imaginary

The social space of a "demonstration." - speech act frameworks, how we stand, or have stood to others and to power [EBH], again, cf. Castells here *Networks of Rage and Order* to consider this in a post-modern, "networked" age

175, "Now what I want to do, in the following pages, is sketch the change-over, the process in which the modern theory of moral order gradually infiltrates and transforms our social imaginary."

175, "What exactly is involved, when a theory penetrates and transforms the social imaginary? Well for the most part, people take up, improvise, or are inducted into new practices. These are made sense of by the new outlook, the one first articulated in the theory; this outlook is the context that gives sense to the practices."

The long march – whereby new social imaginary emerges

3. The Economy as Objectified Reality = (1)

176, "There are in fact three important forms of social self-understanding which I want to deal with iin this essay. They are crucial to modernity, and each of them represents a penetration or transformation of the social imaginary by the Grotian-Lockean theory of moral order."
   - (1) the "economy"
   - (2) the public sphere
   - (3) the practices and outlooks of democratic self-rule
Regarding economy – rooted in earlier notion of Designer and designed

177, "These certainly continue, but what is added in the eighteenth century is an appreciation of the way in which human life is designed so as to produce mutual benefit." - "invisible-hand" factors (Adam Smith) – human beings engaged in an exchange of services = economy

state for the sake of the flourishing of an economy – note discussion of $ and power on pp. 178-79

materialist explanation not sufficient
Reformed Christianity and ordinary life without hierarchy

179, "This is the basis for that sanctification of ordinary life, which I want to claim as had a tremendous formative effect on our civilization, spilling beyond the original religious variant into a myriad secular forms. It has two facets: it promotes ordinary life, as a site for the highest forms of Christian life; and it also has an anti-élitist thrust: it takes down those allegedly higher modes of existence, whether in the Church (monastic vocations), or in the world (ancient derived ethics which place contemplation higher than productive existence)." . . . "Both these facets have been formative of modern civilization."

180, "The new economically-centered notion of natural order underlies the doctrines of harmony of interest."

181, "And so perhaps the first big shift wrought by this new idea of order, both in theory and in social imaginary, consists in our coming to see our society as ab "economy", an interlocking set of activities of production, exchange and consumption, which form a system with its own laws and its own dynamic."

Now, before (2) and (3) - both of these imagine us as collective agencies – democratic age

invisible hand or collective agent – invisible hand among naturally corrupt actors – society unhooked form polity – sociological categories and/or collective movements?

184, "This society dethroned war as the highest human activity, and put in its place production." neutral, no greatness . . .?

Neitzsche and others respond

4. The Public Sphere = (2)

185, "I want to describe the public sphere as a common space in which the members of society are deemed to meet through a variety of media: print, electronic, and also face-to-face encounters; to discuss matters of common interest; and thus to be able to form a common mind about these." *a* common space because intercommunicating

[EBH] Communication power

185, "The public sphere is a central feature of modern society." (cf. Habermas and Warner)

development of public opinion [note dancing around network ideas] – not just technology, but technology in the right cultural context – not just topical common space, but more (187), "We might say that it knits together a plurality of such spaces into one larger space of non-assembly."

- independent from the political
- freedom is central (consent)

188, "This original demand for once-for-all historical consent, as a condition of legitimacy, can easily develop into a requirement of current consent. Government must win the consent of the governed; not just originally, but as an ongoing condition of legitimacy. This is what begins to surface in the legitimation function of public opinion."

First – what it [the public sphere] does – locus of a discussion in which society (or some) comes to common mind
- opinion is likely to be enlightened
- people is sovereign
discussion within (agora) or outside (modern) power

190, What was new, of course, was not that there was an outside check, but rather the nature of this instance. It is not defined as the will of God, or the Law of nature (although it could be thought to articulate these), but as a kind of discourse, emanating from reason and not from power or traditional authority."

a discourse of reason *on* and *to* power, rather than *by* power - (190-91), "So what the public sphere does, is enable the society to come to a common mind, without the mediation of the political sphere, in a discourse of reason outside // power, which nevertheless is normative for power."

- extra-political
- radically secularists
192, "This common action is not made possible by a framework which needs o be established in some action-transcendent dimension: either by an act of God, or in a Great Chain, or by a law which comes down to us since time out of mind. This is what makes it radically secular. And this, I want to claim, gets us to the heart of what is new and unprecedented in it."

194, "Where the constituting factor is nothing other than such common action . . . we have secularity."

195, "Modern "secularization" can be seen from one angle as the rejection of higher times, and the positing of time as purely profane." (vs. establishment of State, church . . . in "higher" time)

196, "An extra-political, secular, meta-topical space, this is what the public sphere was and is."

5. The Sovereign People = (3)

196, "This too [in addition to the other two mutations] starts off as a theory, and then gradually infiltrates and transmutes social imaginaries."
- new theory inspires new practices
- practices are reinterpreted by new theory

example of American revolution vs. French

later fear of God replaced by impersonal benevolence – self-love united with care for common – conscience

Rousseau
        a. virtue a central concept
        b. tends to manicheism
        c. quasi-religious tenor
        d. complex notion of representation

205, "Transparency, that is non-representation, requires a certain form of discourse, where the common will is defined publicly; and even forms of liturgy where it is made manifest for an by the people, and that not once and for all but repeatedly, one might even think obsessively."

206, "Insofar as the general will only exists where there is real virtue, that is, the real fusion of individual and common wills, what can we say of a situation in which many, perhaps even most people are still "corrupt," that is, have not yet achieved this fusion? Its only locus now will be the minority of the virtuous." -

theory of revolution, not necessarily society as such

6. The Direct-Access Society

a number of changes brought with the modern concept of moral order

absence of an action-transcendent grounding
also verticality
209, "There was thus a certain "verrticality" of society, which depended on a grounding in higher time, and which has disappeared in modern society."

210, "By contrast, the modern notion of citizenship is direct. In whatever ways I am related to the rest of society through intermediary organizations, I think of my citizenship as separate from all these. My fundamental way of belonging to the state is not dependent on, or mediated by any of these other belongings."   [EBH] – post-modern state deconstruction of this image?

Summary on 210-11 – different facets of modern equality and individualism

211, "Modern individualism, as a moral ideal, doesn't mean ceasing to belong at all—that's the individualism of anomie and break-down—but imagining oneself as belonging to ever wider and more impersonal entities: the state, the movement, the community of mankind. This is the change that has been described from another angle as the shift from "network" or "relational" identities to "categorical" ones." [EBH] now a post-modern shift "back" to networks?

Chapter 5 – The Spectre of Idealism

Ideas to practices or reverse?

212, "But in fact, what we see in human history is ranges of human practices which are both at once, that is "material" practices carried out by human beings in space and time, and very often coercively maintained, and at the same time, self-conceptions, modes of understanding."

cf. G. A. Cohen for a "masterful account" of historical materialism.

Problem of explanation (213), "The only general rule in history is that there is no general rule identifying one order of motivation as always the driving force." - Marx, Adam Smith, gift economy . . .

214, "In general, a new practice will have both "material" and "ideal" conditions; which we try to explain may depend on which is problematic."

the taming or domestication of the feudal nobility – context of Wars of Religion

215, "This altered the self-understanding of noble and gentry élites, their social imaginary not of the whole society, but of themselves as a class or order within it. . . . The new gentleman required not principally training in arms, but a humanistic education which would enable him to become a "civil" governor. . . . Instead of teaching your boy to joust, get him reading Erasmus, Castiglione, so that he knows how to speak properly, make a good impression, converse persuasively with others in a wide variety of situations."

'courtesy,' civility and the taming of the aristocracy – value of religions

216, "This was powered both by the aspiration to a more complete religious reform, both Protestant and Catholic; and by the ambitions of states to achieve more military power, and hence as a necessary condition, a more productive economy. Indeed these two programmes were often interwoven; reforming governments saw religion as a very good sources of discipline. And many religious reformers, in turn, saw ordered social life as the essential expression of conversion."

Is this idealism? Inextricable interweaving of plural motivations

gets more complicated with equality and broadening of society

217-18, "Now the conditions which I called above quasi-equality have to bridge a wider gap. Without engendering the full-scale contemporary notion of equality, the un- // derstanding of membership in "society" was broadened, and detached from specific gentry or noble features, even while keeping the language of "gentility". - politeness, different venues, classes . . .

218, "As in the earlier idea of civility, too, entering polite society involved broadening one's perspective, and entering into a higher mode of being than the merely private; but the emphasis now is on the virtue of benevolence, and a mode of life less overtly competitive than those fostered by earlier warrior or courtier codes. Eighteenth century polite society even gave rise to an ethic of "sensibility".

Economic, historical consciousness

218, "Commerce, "le doux commerce" was endowed with this power to relegate martial values and the military way of life to a subordinate role, ending their age-old dominance of human culture." Take epoch into consideration now as well.

PART TWO: The Turning Point

Chapter 6 – Providential Deism

221, "Let us return now to the main line of our story: how did exclusive humanism become a live option for large numbers of people, first among élites, and then more generally?"

"The genesis comes about through an intermediate stage, which is often referred to as "Deism"." Three chapters devoted to this -
- notion of the world as designed by God – and anthropocentric shift in this (**chapter 6**)
- impersonal order – God designs order and we follow God by following order (**chapter 7**)
- a true, original, natural religion which has been obscured and needs to be laid clear again **(se pp. 292ff.)**

1. The Anthropocentric Shifts

221, "We saw above how the discourse of the modern moral order reshaped the understanding of Providence. It led in a sense to an "economistic" view of it [EBH – buffered? Ordered? . . ?]. But the change which is fateful for the story I'm following here is the narrowing of the purposes of Divine Providence. God's goals for us shrink to the single end of our encompassing this order of mutual benefit he has designed for us." - directed to the good of the creatures

1) Eclipse of any sense of further purpose – we owe God the achievement of our own good (Tindal)

2) Eclipse of grace – fades
- God creates, endows us with reason
- judge at end (reward or punishment – cf. also the decline of hell)

3) The sense of mystery fades – no particular providences

4) Eclipse of the idea that God was planning transformation of human beings to a beyond (theosis, after-life) – religious fervour fell-off after wars and such

224-25, "A certain // skepticism, even a scoffing attitude could be discerned in many a coffee-house conversation or salon. It was this general climate, rather than widespread unambiguously espoused unbelief, which explains the sense we frequently meet among concerned clergy and other serious believers that they had an important apologetic task on their hands."

just prove existence – because of the new ideas of moral order

225, "What is significant is that the plea for a holy life came to be reductively seen as a call to centre on morality, and morality in turn as a matter of conduct." . . . "less and less concerned with sin as a condition we need to be rescued from through some transformation of our being, and more and more with sin as wrong behaviour which we can be persuaded, trained or disciplined to turn our backs on." . . . "Religion reduced to moralism."

devout humanism of seventeenth century – (227), "But devout humanism supposes that we can find within us that élan towards God on which we can build." Jansenist critique of devout humanism

further reflections on the tensions of the time

228, "It may help reveal: how it came about that a religion of external conduct comes to be so important in the eighteenth century; how the conduct it prescribed was already entrenched by discipline in many strata of he population. And it certainly helps explain how the new affirmation of human innocence arose as a reaction to this sense of depravity and fear, once the inner devotion it animated was no longer widely and deeply felt."

230, "If God's purpose for us really is simply that we flourish, and we flourish by judicious use of industry and instrumental reason, then what possible use could he have for a Saint Francis, who in a great élan of love calls on his followers to dedicate themselves to a life of poverty? At best, this must lower GNP, by withdrawing these mendicants from the workforce; but worse, it can lower the morale of th productive. Better to accept the limitations of our nature as self-loving creatures, and make the best of it."

using [and changing?] the arguments of the Protestant Reformers – praise of ordinary . . .

231 [comparing Whichcote and Tindal on the human good which God wills], " . . . this stance of Whichcote's remains very much within the broader tradition. For him, the good of ours which God pursues includes "deification", the raising of human nature to participate in the divine. For Tindal, on the other hand, he purposes nothing beyond ordinary human flourishing."

Another reason for the narrowing of religious outlook – buffered self and disengaged reason – discussions of theodicy

233, "So we can get a sense of the complex forces which brought about the fourfold eclipse I'm capturing in my ideal type of "Providential Deism". Partly **[1]** the social experience of successful imposition of order and discipline, on self and on society; partly **[2]** the carrying forward of reflections which were already very much part of anyway, Reformed Christianity, and pushing them on to a more radical stage; partly **[3]** a reaction against the juridical-penal framework which Medieval and Reformed Christianity had made into an exclusive horizon. This reaction had its profound Christian sources, in the Greek Fathers, for instance; but it served as well to bolster Deism; as it would serve soon to power exclusive humanism."

What remained of God? Creator, providence, afterlife

233, "From being the guarantor that goo will triumph, or at least hold its own, in a world of spirits and meaningful forces, he becomes (1) the essential energizer of that ordering power through which we disenchant the world, and turn it to our purposes. As the very origin of our being, spiritual and material, he (2) commands our allegiance and worship, a worship which is now purer through being disintricated from the enchanted world."
    But with the fourfold eclipse [above], the very notion that God has purposes for us beyond fulfilling his plan in the world, equated with our good, begiins to fade. Worship shrinks to carrying out God's goals (= our goals) in the world. So element (2) becomes weaker and weaker."
    regarding (1) space created for shift where (234), "the power to order will be seen as purely intra-human"

So exclusive humanism could arise in this given two conditions:
 • negative – enchanted word fade
 • positive – our highest aspirations possible (imposed order)

234, "The points at which God had seemed an indispensable source for this ordering power were the ones which began to fade and become invisible. The hitherto unthinkable became thinkable."

2. The Culture of Polite Society

234, "I want to look more closely at the transition from the first [thinkable] to the second [actually thought] [EBH – Taylor is meticulous about articulating, and then demonstrating, the various conditions within which exclusive humanism could have arisen—and then did. He covers both conditions in the society as well as thought-possibilities in the minds of the populations concerned]. It occurs within the culture which developed among the élites of the advanced societies of Western Europe in the eighteenth century, the culture of "polite" society."

What was this idea of polite society? Contrast to medieval
- productive one – giving an important place to the useful arts, improvement, progress
- fine arts – refined
- characteristic styles of action - "manners" and such (cf. Taylor's delightful description of coffee-house/salon life on p. 235)
- beneath manners is 'les moeurs'

236, "But what changed in that time was not so much the explicitly valid rules of society, but the spirit, the unofficial and largely implicit norms of élite exchange. . . . a change in outlook: a widening of the mind, refinement of sensibility, greater interest in the sciences and philosophy."

modern moral order: liberty, mutual benefit, productive activities
Independent
- independent from the political structure

237, "The link established here between th modern moral order and "civilization" also illustrates one of the principal theses I am defending in this work, the close connection between the ideal of order and the disciplines and modes of organization by which society was to be "civilized". It was, in fact, the felt success of these forms of self-fashioning which underwrote the confidence in this sociability as an independent criterion. In terms of our discussion above, we might say that the culture of politeness was the first stage in the passage of the modern moral order from a mere theory to a form of a social imaginary, here underpinning the practices of an educated and "polished" élite."

- independent from ecclesiastical or particular-doctrinal authority (anger against revocation of Edict of Nantes . . .)

238, "Polite sociability puts a strain on allegiance to strong forms of sacral authority. . . . Hence the polite outlook is more hospitable to what I have called disenchantment, and this new culture is a continuation of the process of sidelining the sacred."

Dangerous religion – superstition, fanaticism, enthusiasm [Taylor develops the modern reaction to these]

242, "Polite civilization provides the stage, the site of potential grave conflict with Christianity, in which different reactions were possible." - [including exclusive humanism]

3. The Rise of Exclusive Humanism: what this rise looks like

242, "Let me try to bring out the main lines of my argument again, in order to delineate better what remains to be said."

First two of fourfold shift crucial, carrying others with them:
- carrying out mutual benefit was God's plan – improvement of people and whole of civilization
- we can encompass it [the goal] with our unaided forces (grace seems less essential)

245, "This means that it had not only to incorporate the confidence that we can actually re-order and reshape our lives, but also the motivation to carry this out for the benefit of all. . . . A standard subtractionist story would convince us that once the old religious and metaphysical beliefs withered away, room was finally made for the existing, purely human moral motivation. But this was not the case."

Differences of exclusive humanism from ancient:
- activist, interventionist stance
- universalism developed form Christian roots
- supposes that humans are motivated to act for the good of our fellow human beings (altruism, drive to beneficence)

247, "I have been stressing the way in which modern humanisms innovated in relation to the ancients, drawing on the forms of Christian faith they emerged from: active re-ordering, instrumental rationality; universalism; benevolence. But of course, their aim was also to reject the Christian aspiration to transcend flourishing."

247, "Think of the contempt of a Hume or a Gibbon for the Christian ascetic traditions, for monasticism, for missionaries, for prophesying, for the emotional preaching of the Wesleyans."

restatement of negative (eclipse) and positive (potential)

250, "And so the new humanism needed, and found, inner sources of benevolence. And this in more than one way."
- a strong sense of the powers of disengaged instrumental reason
- sense of pure, universal will (251[on Kant]), "the very power to act by universal law is an object of wonder and infinite respect"
- universal sympathy (Rousseau)
- the powers we have attributed to God are really human potentialities (Feuerbach)

These are new modes of moral experience, not just theories

253, "What we have here in this discovery of new moral motivations is a composite, experience and reality claim together, amounting to new modes of moral life, which in placing the moral sources within us constitute forms of exclusive humanism. This is what the subtraction story has difficulty accounting for."

Now move to discuss desire – a revolution here

253, "the revolution consists in a rehabilitation of ordinary, untransformed human desire and self-love, previously seen as an obstacle to universal justice/benevolence, which now is cast either as innocent, or as a positive force for good."
1. "innocentizing" strategy – human motivation as neutral

2. positive strategy – original, unspoiled human motivation as including a bent to solidarity with all others

255, "So exclusive humanism wasn't just something we fell into, once the old myths dissolved, or the "infamous" ancien régime church was crushed. . . . It is an achievement . . . .   we have to recognize that the development of this purely immanent sense of human solidarity is an important achievement, a milestone in human history."

the ontic component- intrahuman

aside vs. the "post-modernists"

256, "The two strategies I noted above which show benevolence to be an inner capacity correspond to the two major views about its ontic placement in our nature."
- benevolence as the fruit of our escaping our narrow particular standpoint (256), "We rise to it through enlightenment and discipline"
- root of it in our deep nature, original propensity to sympathy

257, "But however it is conceived, the discovery/definition of these intra-human sources of benevolence is one of the great achievements of our civilization, and the charter of modern unbelief. . . . "Deism" provides the framework, but this progress supplied the "material conditions" for the leap."

yet other conditions: disengagement, secularization of public space, self-understanding of agency

whole turn driven by religious motives

258, "The story of a rejection of the old, unchanging religion, which uncovers and releases the perennial human, is wrong on both counts. Re-invention, innovation exist on both sides, and continuing mutual influence links them."

4. So What About Now?

Does this all help us to understand the present age?
What have I been saying?
　　　First - exclusive humanism arose in connection with alternative moral sources
　　　Second – it couldn't have risen any other way at the time

259, "But third, I want to make the further claim that this origin still counts today; that the much wider range of unbelieving positions available today is still somehow marked by this origin point in the ethic of the beneficent order."

First – development of freedom, welfare, public opinion in 17th and 18th centuries

260, "It seems to me that we can understand this whole movement as a continued working out of the demands of this ethic, together with an ever more insistent demand that it be put into practice."
　　　Now it is within this movement that first, Providential "Deism", and then the early influential formulations of exclusive humanism arise. The coincidence in time seems undeniable, but I am pleading for a closer connection. What is it?"

Exclusive humanism begins to look plausible because of the anthropological shifts (review)

fading of the need for God and God's transcendent plan and a rise of the sense of human power

262, "In short, the buffered ientity, capable of disciplined control and benevolence, generated its own sense of dignity and power, its own inner satisfactions, and these could tilt in favour of exclusive humanism."

also negative motive – (262), "anger at, even hatred of orthodox Christianity."

Three positions: depends on personal experience, temperament . . .
- (1) Some aligned the "true", reformed faith with civilization and "politeness"
- (2) reacted against this alignment (Evangelical reaction)
- (3) agreed with definition as the Christian way and rejected it as enemy (Gibbon)
[EBH] here discussion of relations to the "world"

264, "What emerges clearly from this, however, is that, in both its positive and its negative motives, the rise of exclusive humanism was closely tied to the ethic of freedom and beneficent order. It was the centrality of this ethic, and the relative success in carrying it out, which fostered the anthropocentric turn. And it was the strong moral satisfactions of this successful ordering which positively motivated the embracing of the new humanism; while it was the failings of religion in relation to this ethic which often negatively motivated the move." vs. subtraction theory

seaculum and two views of time (and monasticism) and the notion of Reformation

265, "The process I have been calling Reform alters the terms of this coexistence [spiritual and secular]; in the end it comes close to wiping out the duality altogether." along three vectors:
1. Make the mass of laity shape up (Hildebrand=Gregory VII)
2. Protestant Reformation
3. Disenchantment

266-67, "There is no more separate sphere of the "spiritual" where one may go to pursue a life of prayer outside the saeculum; and nor is there the other alternation, between order and anti-order, which Carnival represented. There is just this one relentless order of tight thought and action, which must occupy all social and personal space.
        How then does the break-out occur? Because the very attempt to express what the Christian life means in terms of a code of action in the saeculum opens the possibility of devising a code whose main aim is to encompass the basic goods of life in the saeculum: life, prosperity, peace, mutual benefit. In other words, it makes possible what I called the anthropological shift. Once this happens the break-out is // ready to occur."

267, "So much for my **first** thesis."   [see p. 259, "Alternative moral sources"] "But how about the **second** claim, that it could not have been otherwise; that an unbelieving ethos couldn't have arisen in any other form?"

267, "How could the immense force of religion in human life in that age be countered, except by using a modality of the most powerful ethical ideas, which this religion itself had helped to entrench?"

vs. subtraction story

268, "But my hypothesis is, that without the new moral understandings I have been describing, it [Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*] would have had little impact. . . . Other modes of unbelief could arise later; but they needed the humanism of beneficent order to blaze the trail."

268, "This brings me to my **third** claim, that all contemporary unbelief is still marked by that origin."

historical consciousness of the achievements

269, "Rather, all present issues around secularism and belief are affected by a double historicity, a two-tiered perfect-tensedness. On one hand, unbelief and exclusive humanism defined itself in relation to earlier modes of belief, both orthodox theism and enchanted understandings of the world; and this definition remains inseparable from unbelief today. On the other hand, later-arising forms of unbelief, as well as all attempts to redefine and recover belief, define themselves in relation to this first path-breaking humanism of freedom, discipline, and order."

Chapter 7 – The Impersonal Order

(2) See p. 221

1. The Deism Slide

270, "The crucial feature here is a change in the understanding of God, and his relation to the world. That is, there is a drift away from orthodox Christian conceptions of God as an agent interacting with humans and intervening in human history; and towards God as architect of a universe by unchanging laws, which humans have to conform to or suffer the consequences."   . . . . "Deism can be seen as a half-way house on the road to contemporary atheism."

270, "I want to contest this [subtractionist approach]." separate some of the strands that the subtractionist theory runs together
   •   disenchantment
   •   new stance toward history (and an aside about historiography)

274, "I could generalize at this point. The slide to Deism was not just the result of "reason" and "science", but reflected a deep seated moral distaste for the old religion that sees God as an agent in history."

What about claims of Santa Teresa of John Wesley . . . ?

275, "But that's just the point: their stance is nor forced on them by the "facts", but flows from a certain interpretive grid."

A look at the issues involved: [he distinguishes Christianity from classical though here]
(1) The body – nature of body and heart
(2) History – fall and return
(3) Individuals – the place of the individual
(4) Contingency – fate or divine sovereignty within human freedom
(5) Emotions – affirmation

(6) God as Personal Being – therefore interpersonal relationship possible

278-79, "In this crucial sense, // salvation is thwarted to the extent that we treat God as an impersonal being, or as merely the creator of an impersonal order to which we have to adjust. Salvation is only effected by, one might say is, our being in communion with God through the communityt of humans in communion, viz., the church."

279, "The whole package, 1-6, arose out of a struggle, that of Patristic theology, with earlier ideals of impersonal order. . . . Now in the modern period, we see this package challenged by new understandings of order, running at one end of the spectrum from Deism, to modern atheist materialism, on the other."

How the options integrate 1-5

279, "But unlike the Christian package, the elements 1-5 which are taken up are utterly removed from their context in communion." [6]

280, "So we return to the question above: what made this grid so powerful? Features "which made the idea of God as a personal agent unattractive or threatening, and pushed people along the continuum in the direction of Deism or even farther."

280, "The pull towards the "impersonal" pole of this continuum becomes more understandable when one takes account of the way in which the human condition was more and more understood in terms of impersonal orders; and this process was grasped as a historical consciousness which saw the impersonal as superseding the personal."

[1] – natural-cosmic order

281, "My point is the logically weaker but hermeneutically understandable one that the predominance of impersonal, unrespondent order in the universe, which was known to follow an age in which people had believed in a meaningful cosmos, can be felt to accredit the idea that we have entered a new age in which the older religion is no more at home."

[2] – modern social imaginaries (not feudal networks, but categorical egalitarian order)

[3] – ethical consequences

interesting discussion of Christianity and network here (pp 282f)

283, "Thus here, too, modernity, as the era of freedom, can be seen to be congruent with out relating ourselves to an impersonal law, not to the goals which arise out of a personal relation."

283, "The natural [1], social [2], ethical [3] orders all tend to further this slide towards the impersonal. But we can see this slide from another angle as well, as driven by our self-understanding as disengaged, rational agents [4] [EBH – 1-3 are the negative, decrease of divine; 4 is the positive, increase of the human]

objectification and neutralizing mechanism

problems with disengagement in ordinary life and with orthodox understandings of relationship with God (286) -

superstition

excarnation mentioned along with aesthetic experience (288), "where embodied feeling can still be allowed to open us to something higher."

288, "So putting it all together, we can see how a certain kind of framework understanding came to be constituted: fed by the powerful presence of impersonal orders, cosmic, social, and moral; drawn by the power of the disengaged stance, and its ethical prestige, and ratified by a sense of what the alternative was, based on an élite's derogatory and somewhat fearful portrait of popular religion, an unshakable sense could arise of our inhabiting an immanent, impersonal order, which screened out, for those who inhabited it, all phenomena which failed to fit this framework."

One more thing: enframement in historical consciousness (stadial, progress from and to)

[5] The stadial consciousness

289, "This stadial consciousness is, so to speak, the ratchet at the end of the anthropo-centric shift, which makes it (near) impossible to go back on it."

Summarize temper among the élites: [he rehearses the shifts]

clearly expressed in Unitarianism (291), "the defining theological beliefs of Unitarianism reflect the shift clearly."

292, "Whether through Unitarianism, or some other route, the primacy given to impersonal order ended up producing in the nineteenth century a tamed version of Christianity, tailored to suit its demands."

2. Original Natural Religion [= (2) p. 221]

292, "The anthropocentric shift, and the slide to impersonal order; we can see how the movement with these two facets would also show us a third. Such a purified religion, where God reveals himself through His creation, making demands on us which this Creation itself reveals to our rational scrutiny, and also making otiose all the forms of personal relation between Creator and creatures: personal fidelity, petitionary prayer, attempts to placate or implicate God in our fate, and the like; this is a religion founded on reality. It is based on Nature, or Reason alone."

293, "Rid the world of these superstitions, and humans will find peace, concord, and mutual help. . . . Here we can see the shift from belief to atheism, via the intermediary stage of what I've been calling "Providential Deism". . . . It really reflects a major shift in our background understanding of the human epistemic predicament."   What is means to reason about God or "religion"

discussion about contemporary apologetics – reasoning toward God from within modern framework, rather than within people of God (cf. Hauerwas' Gifford lectures)

294, "As should be clear from the above argument, I cannot accept this kind of account because it utterly passes over the ways in which this new self-understanding has been constructed in our history.

From the opposed perspective [Taylor's?], we can trace the way in which the theolotical understanding of an Aquinas was lost . . ." (295), "Hence the importance of studies which show how the subject was changed through a series of steps involving late Scholasticism, Duns Scotus, nominalism, "possibilism", Occam, Cajetan and Suareez, Descartes, where each stage appeared to be addreessing the same issues as the predecessors it criticized, while in fact the whole framework slid away and came to be replaced by another." list of authors who have "contributed to this critique of this unconscious distortion of the medieval sources."

problems in post-Darwin world [EBH – and more in postmodernity]

295, "The development of the disciplined, instrumentally rational order of mutual benefit has been the matrix within which the shift could take place. This shift is the heartland and origin of modern "secularization" in the third sense in which I have been using this term: that is, of the new conditions in which belief and unbelief uneasily coexist, and often struggle with each other in contemporary society. But this matrix does more than illumine the shift; it can also help account for some of the struggle. In its light, we can understand some of the reactions against "modernity", and the impact they have had on modern belief, both for and against. To a consideration of this, I now turn."

PART THREE: THE NOVA EFFECT

Chapter 8 – The Malaises of Modernity   (see Taylor's *The Malaise of Modernity*, 1992)

299, Trying to give an account of the development of contemporary secularity 3 – three stages:
- how an exclusive humanist alternative
- further diversification - "It's as though the original duality, the positing of a viable humanist alternative, set in train a dynamic, something like a nova effect, spawning an ever-widening variety of moral/spiritual options, across the span of the thinkable and perhaps even beyond."
- generalized to whole societies (beyond élites) – relatively recent

1. How the Nova Effect Works

300, "For the moment I want to describe the culture or conditions of belief among those strata which carried the Deist-humanist shifts."

satisfaction with power, reason, invulnerability – also sense of historical placement.

Yet this can also be a prison – indeed, sensed as such by some. Thus, "a wide sense of malaise at the disenchanted world, a sense of it as flat, empty, a multiform search for something within, or beyond it."

1) (302), "growing category of people who while unable to accept orthodox Christianity are seeking some alternative spiritual sources."

cross-pressured – can't accept modern moral synthesis, but also can't accept Christianity

302, "But the situation remains unstable, in the sense that there is no long term movement towards a resolution of whatever kind."

2) we can read this cross-pressure from within the buffered self – ontic doubt "itself is integral to the modern malaise" fragilization of all the different views (303)

304, "The distances have vanished. . . . Homogeneity and instability work together to bring the fragilizing effect of pluralism to a maximum."

2. Negative Reactions to the Modern Package

Summary of indictments against orthodox religion (305); comment on theodicy

A. Against the buffered identity within the immanent, impersonal order (along several axes)

- with the eclipse of the transcendent, something may have been lost [immanent-transcendent axis] - "malaises of immanence" (309)
  - absence of or problems with "meaning of life" - overarching significance
  - flatness concerning the key moments in life (birth, marriage, death)
  - emptiness of the ordinary

309, "But it doesn't follow that the only cure for them is a return to transcendence." - fill gap from within (justice and prosperity, resonance to everyday

Define the different axes of criticism or objection:

- I. Axes of Resonance (Peggy Lee - "Is that all there is?")
  - (1) charity too pale in Deism/humanism (Evangelicals, Rousseau)
  - (2) Kant – ruins potential for human moral ascent
  - (3) charge of moralism (is this really the highest end? - Wesley, Schiller . . .)
- II. Romantic axes (in Romantic period)
  - (1) the place of harmonious unity within the self (Rousseau, Schiller, Shaftsbury, D. H. Lawrence) - "criticisms that the Romantic age levelled at the disengaged, disciplined, buffered self, and the world it had built."
  - (2) division from the great unity of nature
  - (3) protest against the buffered self as such – (315), "The sense is here that in closing ourselves to the enchanted world, we have been cut off from a great source of life and meaning, . . ." and not just Christian
  - (4) the malaise at the adoption of a purely instrumental, "rational" stance toward the world or human life
- III. Critique of the Modern as too Facile or Optimistic
  - [1] all too pat (Voltaire's *Candide*, Neitzsche)
  - [2] vs. benevolence and universalism – too much levelling down and equalizing
  - [3] simplistic understanding of happiness in modern ideas of order
  - no place for death

Chapter 9 – The Dark Abyss of Time (19th cen)

322, the nineteenth century "is a period in which the gamut of alternatives of this range becomes richer and wider."

Reprise, not simply continuation because of surge of piety

322, "So the turn to unbelief in the middle or later nineteenth century is in a way something new. It's not just that the movement is wider than its eighteenth-century predecessor; . . . It is in a sense deeper."

323, "But this depth is a reflection of something else, viz., that the unbelieving outlooks were more deeply anchored in the lifeworld and background sense of reality of nineteenth-century people than the analogous views of their eighteenth-century predecessors." Two ways -

1. Shift from cosmos to universe had progressed further

- (1) – cosmic imaginary
- (2) – nature feels vast, infinite: spread over aeons

325, "But this whole understanding, defined by this sense of limits, has been swept away. . . . scientific discovery did indeed play a salient, even decisive role in the change-over. . . . but not just *theory*

both space and especially time – (327) "the remote past becomes dark. It is dark because unfathomable"

327, "The earlier cosmos ideas saw the world as fixed, unvarying. But our consciousness of the universe is dominated by the sense that things evolve."

[EBH] – I see, perhaps, a kind of "re-enchantment" here – a sense of mysterious embedding in something unfathomable within which we have our being, but cannot fully explain it.

328, What was needed before these "facts" could bear scientific fruit were two things, the availability of alternative frameworks, and the waning of the hold of the older cosmos ideas on the imagination."

analogously to and farther from the Protestant Reformation

examples of Burnet and Vico cross-pressured

development of "sublime" ethics – the moral meaning of the sublime (338ff) – a felt critique of modern anthropocentrism

        (3?) depth of the human person – (345) "moral imagination of nature" [I think Taylor could have introduced a kind of "psychological imaginary" here-and-now

wild and pre-human

346-47, "I have been arguing here that to understand the transformation in our outlook from cosmos to universe, we cannot just limit ourselves to the changes in our theoretical beliefs. These have taken us from picture of a limited, ordered and static cosmos to a universe which is immeasurably vast, and in constant evolution. It is // not just that our theories have changed, but the spontaneous, unreflecting understanding which provides the context for these beliefs has also altered." [EBH – not the modern disappearance of the mysterious, but rather the transfer of this sense]

vastness and evolution. The way we see and experience things, deep time and unfathomable spaces

347, "This complex of theories, unreflective understanding and moral imagination is the dominant one in Western Civilization in our time. It saturates our world."

cerebral unconscious

wide range of views within which the cosmic imaginary is grasped – Christian, Goethe, Emerson, deep nature . . .

351, "Thus the salient feature of the modern cosmic imaginary . . . is that it has opened a space in which people can wander between and around all these options without having to land clearly and definitively in any one. In the wars between belief and unbelief, this can be seen as a kind of no-man's-land; except that it has got wide enough to take on the character rather of <mark>a neutral zone, where one can escape the war altogether</mark>. Indeed, this is part of the reason why the war is constantly running out of steam in modern civilization, in spite of the efforts of zealous minorities." I will try to explain this more fully

Chapter Ten – The Expanding Universe of Unbelief

1. The Languages of Art

352, "The creation of this free space has been made possible in large part by the shift in the place and understanding of art that came in the Romantic period. This is related to the shift from an understanding of art as mimesis to one that stresses creation. It concerns what one would call the languages of art, that is, the publicly available reference points that, say, poets and painters draw on." [EBH – I would talk about semiotics here]

examples of commonly held correspondence which no longer work

352, "But to grasp this forest [of symbols], we need to understand not so much the erstwhile public doctrine (about which no one remembers any details anyway) but, as we might put it, the way it resonates in the poet's sensibility."

353, "We can describe the change this way: where formerly poetic language could rely on certain publicly available orders of meaning, it now has to consist in a language of articulated sensibility."

first and second disembedding

356, "Subtler languages which have taken this "absolute" turn, unhooked themselves from intentional objects (music), or the assertoric (poetry), or the object represented (painting), are moving in a new field. The ontic commitments are very unclear. This means that such art can serve to disclose very deep truths which in the nature of things can never be obvious, nor available to everyone, regardless of spiritual condition." . . . "The idea is: the mystery, the depth, the profoundly moving, can be, for all we know, entirely anthropological. Atheists, humanists cling on to this, as they go to concerts, operas, read great literature."

decay of old languages – modern; not comfortable leaving it – reactions to the modern (357), "In more general terms, the struggle is to recover a kind of vision of something deeper, fuller, in recognition that this cannot be easy, that it requires insight and creative power."

connection between cosmic imaginary and subtler languages

reach our highest goal through the aesthetic

359, "Now as I argued above, these languages function, have power, move us, but without having to identify their ontic commitments. "Absolute" music expresses being moved by what is powerful and deep, but does not need to identify where this is to be found, whether in heaven, or on earth, or in the depths of our own being—or whether these alternatives are exclusive."

360, "And this is what offers a place to go for modern unbelief. As a response to the inadequacies of moralism, the missing goal can be identified with the experience of beauty, in the realm of the aesthetic. But this is now unhooked from the ordered cosmos and/or the divine."

361, "The loss of pre-modern languages shows how embedded we are in the buffered identity, but the continued attempt to devise subtler languages shows how difficult it is just to leave things there, not to try to compensate for, to replace those earlier vehicles of now problematic insight. This is another cultural fact about modernity, which testifies in the same sense as the concern for lost meaning. It bespeaks the malaise, the uncertainties, which inhabit the buffered identity."
        The shift from cosmos to universe did two important things. It allowed for the development of deeper and more solid forms of materialism and unbelief, and it also gave new shape to the cross-pressure felt by the buffered identity between belief and unbelief. Along with the development of post-Romantic art, it helps to create a neutral space between these."

2. The Maturing of Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century

361, "I now want to connect up to the beginning of this section by examining the naturing of unblief in this period."

reasons for renouncing religion - very wide gamut

in 19ᵗʰ century
*   humanism superior to Christianity in altruism
*   rehabilitation of ordinary, sensuous nature
2 new factors
*   First, the impact of science and scholarship (not just "facts")

363, "Now I think that an important part of the force which drove many people to see science and religion as incompatible, and to opt for the former, comes from this crucial difference in form. In other words, the success of science built upon and helped to entrench in them the sense that the Christian religion they were familiar with belonged to an earlier, more primitive or less mature form of understanding."

*   Second, the place of the new cosmic imaginary – vast universe where a personal God is absent, affinity with the moral view from nowhere. Yet not necessarily materialistic (though materialist "adulthood")

365, 'We can see from all this how much the appeal of scientific materialism is not so much the cogency of its detailed findings as that of the underlying epistemological stance, and that for ethical

reasons. It is seen as the stance of maturity, of courage, of manliness, over against childish fears and sentimentality."   cf. also below

366, "This whole way of seeing things, which comes about through the joint effect of science and the new cosmic imaginary, helped along by a notion of maturity which they generate along with the buffered identity, has brought about modes of unbelief which are much more solid. They are more firmly anchored, both in our sense of our world, and in the scientific and technological practices by which we know it and deal with it."

366, "But materialism has not only solidified, it has also deepened." . . . (367), "Already the Epicureans had made this point in one form. To know that all comes from atoms and their swervings, that the Gods are utterly unconcerned with us, is to liberate us from fear of the beyond, and thus allow us to achieve ataraxia. Modern materialism takes up this legacy, but gives it the characteristically modern activist twist: in this purposeless universe, we decide what goals to pursue. Or else we find them in the depths, our depths, that is, something we can recognize as coming from deep within us. In either case, it is we who determine the order of human things—and who can thus discover in ourselves the motivation, and the capacity, to build the order of freedom and mutual benefit, in the teeth of an indifferent and even hostile universe."

materialism as varied in its forms

368, unbelief also solidified and deepened in the 19th cen in "that the forms of social imaginary built around simultaneity and action in purely secular time—the market economy, the public sphere, the polity of popular sovereignty—were becoming more and more dominant." does not demand unbelieving outlook, but can consort with one
        shared properties rather than network of personal relations (vs. medieval network society – lost religiously)

3. The Immanent Counter-Enlightenment

369, "The deeper, more anchored forms of unbelief arising in the nineteenth century are basically the same as those which are held today. . . Romantic influence . . . We are still living in the aftermath of this shift to depth, even though we may contest these particular theories. In this respect, we might be tempted to say that modern unbelief starts then, and not really in the Age of the Enlightenment. The nineteenth century would be the moment when "the Modern Schism" occurred."

important turn in moral imagination – along the "tragic" axis [III above] – against the values of the Enlightenment, yet remaining resolutely naturalist. Thus "immanent counter-Enlightenment"

development of ideas through Reformers and beyond – use of Reformer ideas in secularist arguments, summarizing Enlightenment

371, "This is the complex legacy of the Enlightenment which I am trying to describe here. It incorporates a powerful humanism, affirming the importance of preserving and enhancing life, of avoiding death and suffering, an eclipse/denial of transcendence which tends to make this humanism an exclusive one, and a dim historical sense that the first of these cam about through and depends on the second."

Resistance to this idea/vision of Enlightenment – flattening of human life . . . - two sources

(1) continuing spiritual concern with the transcendent
(2) levelling effects of the culture of equality and benevolence

Character of this immanent counter-Enlightenment
- linked with the primacy of the aesthetic
- literature departments
- new understanding of the centrality of death

Neitzsche and his legacy

374, "What I have been calling the immanent counter-Enlightenment thus involves a new valorization of, even fascination with death and sometimes violence. It rebels against the exclusive humanism that dominates modern culture. But it also rejects all previous ontically-grounded understandings of transcendence. If we took account of this, we might perhaps change our picture of modern culture. Instead of seeing it as the scene of a two-sided battle, between "tradition", especially religious tradition, and secular humanism, we might rather see it as a kind of free-for-all, the scene of a three-cornered—perhaps ultimately, a four-cornered—battle." [EBH – reflections on Phyllis Tickle's categories in the final chapters of *The Great Emergence* here]

4. Summary of the Development of 19th Century Unbelief

374, "In the nineteenth century, one might say, unbelief comes of age. It develops a solidity and a depth, but also and perhaps above all, a variety, a complex of internal differences. So that for many people in many milieux in our day, it can become a world unto itself. That is, for them it circumscribes the horizon of the potentially believable."

What has changed between 1500 and 2000 (375), "when there are not only lost of happy atheists, but in certain milieux faith is bucking a powerful current?"

Good narrative summary of movement through humanisms

375, "The shift in cosmic imaginaries intensifies and completes this undermining of our sense of ordering presence. . . . It is also that the vast, unfathomable universe in its dark abyss of time makes it all too possible to lose sight of this ordering presence altogether."

376, different from 1500 again "because it is the sense of an absence; it is the sense that all order, all meaning comes from us."   "We encounter no echo outside. In the world read this way, as so many of our contemporaries live it, the natural/supernatural distinction is no mere intellectual abstraction. A race of humans had arisen which has managed to experience its world entirely as immanent. In some respects, we may judge this achievement as a victory for darkness, but it is a remarkable achievement nonetheless."

Chapter Eleven – Nineteenth-Century Trajectories

will not trace nova further into late 19th and 20th centuries. Rather a few illustrative cases in England and France

1. England: Comparing Carlyle and Arnold (and beyond) on the Cosmic Order

leaving and/or recreating religion

387, "These reflections of Carlyle and Arnold were the bridges which people started to cross out of Christianity to some religion of impersonal order, before their structure was shaken by the controversy over evolution, . . ." -

science and religion again, theodicy again; (389), "In a sense, the only possible stance for a Christian is to recover something like the pre-modern one." . . . short developments

389, "Theodicy thus may have played some role in the recession of these theories of cosmic force. But this cannot be the whole story. Perhaps the crucial point was this: as attempts to hold on to some of the force of Christian piety, while dropping the Christian God of personal agency, these middle positions didn't have the staying power. In the end they could win minds but not hearts."

note on France, Compte . . .

2. Notes on the Moral Order #1 - Background

391-92, "At the same time as these conceptions of impersonal order on the cosmic level, variants of the modern order of mutual benefit, as well as reactions against it, have played an important role in the development of what I'm calling the nova, the mul- // tiplication of new options around the polemic between belief and unbelief in the last two centuries."

cf. changes since the Declaration of Independence (392), "In these "Anglo-Saxon" societies, and in other similar ones, the modern idea of an order of equal-rights-bearing individuals, related so as to further mutual benefit, has gradually colonized the social imaginary." . . . "replacement of the ertical model with the horizontal one."

British, Protestant, decent (in high Victorian, Christian),

Evangelical reaction (396), "This moral psychology of will and struggle reflects the Evangelical outlook out of which the new humanism emerged, of which it was a transposition into an immanent key." - "manliness"

397, "Victorian Christianity created the space for humanism, but this by itself doesn't explain what motivated the shift." reactions against Christianity, science, modern cosmic imaginary . . .

398, "And so a new space for unbelief emerges, a humanism of altruism and duty, often rooted in an enriched materialism. This leaves much of the reigning synthesis intact, which linked Britishness, law, decency, civilization, and religion. It lops off the last element, but insists just as much on discipline, will, character-formation, and the long but successful historical struggle to realize the synthesis in this happy Isle. A quite new set of spaces open up, however, when this synthesis is challenged."

various reactions along various axes – nature, art, aesthetic . . .

3. Notes on the Moral Order #2 – New Spaces for Unbelief in 19th and early 20th England

- moralism inadequate, supplemented with higher culture (Arnold, Mill, Macaulay Trevelyan)
- three positions regarding indeterminancy of Romanticism (all with aesthetic as important ethical category)

- ○ remain with it
- ○ disambiguate toward "tradition"
- ○ secular transcendent

can't solve, but (407), "In the meantime, I want just to appreciate the importance of these new spaces for unbelief, whereby the reaction even against "materialism" . . . isn't driven to religious forms, but can find atheist expression."

4. Consequences of the World War(s)

407, "But then came the trauma of the First World War. This damaged the credibility of the [modern] synthesis as nothing earlier could have done." (408), "for an influential minority of the young, who had served in the trenches, or who came along after, it shattered their faith in the whole complex."

Various directions – League of Nations, Left or Right (408), "But instead of this, or perhaps alongside it, the trauma could create a sense of uncertainty, of disbelief and even cynicism." Elliot's "Waste Land"

2nd WW (409), "In a sense, the terrible trauma of the First World War was paradoxically resolved at least in part by the Second." yet slide

409, "What then was the legacy of the inter-war years? A further retreat from belief because of the implication of Christian faith in the discarded synthesis: . . . . But also the sense of living in a shattered order has remained at some level as a truth of experience."

410, "I said above that unease was felt among élites; it wasn't necessarily where the mass of people were in the '20s and the '30s; even less so in 1945. But the line between élite and mass has been steadily eroding in the twentieth century; formerly minority reactions are spreading." . . .

410, "All this has tended on balance to widen the spaces of unbelief." . . . (411), "The spaces for unbelief are more varied and complex, and there is more acceptance of the irrational and negative elements they involve. But fundamentally, the buffered identity is inhabited with the same unruffled confidence."

5. Shifts in Other European Societies

French Republican anti-Christian sentiment

Marxist socialism in Spain, Mexico . . .

412, "This line-up between moral order, human rights and democracy, and atheism, helped to provoke the counter-line-up, that of "Reaction".

414, "So an ideal order in its different variants, starting from the individual, and stressing rights, liberties and democracy, squares off against a counter-ideal which stresses obedience, hierarchy, belonging to, even sacrifice for a larger whole." - not simple but bumpy, cross-overs . . .

414, "More seriously, towards the end of the century movements arise which are based on some variant of the counter-ideal, but which break progressively loose from their Christian moorings."

Charles Maurras

again, results of the War outside England (416), "At a deeper level, the War was a crisis of civilization, that is, it called into question the basic assumption that the belligerent states were truly civilized, or else more deeply, the very idea of civilization itself."

value(s) of war?, up the ante and promise still higher civilization? (these crushed later)

Two kinds of reaction:
1. (418), "the crisis of civvilization was also a crisis of a certain kind of Christian culture. . . . Elsewhere, the civilizational crisis of the First World War was a body blow to established faiths, from which they have never recovered."

2. development of new, unbelieving variants of the vertical ideal of order (fascism . . .); "the aestheticization of politics" power in the face of death . . . (419), "although a glance at Islamic societies shows that this [leaving behind the praise of power in the face of death and such] is far from universal"

delinking of religion from society

PART FOUR: NARRATIVES OF SECULARIZATION

Chapter 12 – The Age of Mobilization   (@1800-1960)

1. Review of the meaning of "secularization" again – summary and secularization theory

423, "This process of élite pluralization continues throughout the nineteenth century, at different paces, and with differently spaced interruptions in different societies.
        But somehow, in the intervening two centuries, the predicament of the then upper strata has become that of whole societies. Not only has the palatte of options (religious and areligious) widened, but the very locus of the religious, or the spiritual, in social life has shifted. How did this come about?"

Here we enter onto the terrain of "secularization theory." - and from here on Taylor begins a dialogue periodically with representatives of different schools of thought in secularization theory.

424, "So in order to understand how what were alternatives for the few became so for the many, it will be helpful to lean on what is known about the decline or lack of decline of belief. The story is incredibly complicated . . ."

a. Diffusion? - (424), "But the actual road from there to here has been much more bumpy and indirect than a simple diffusion story can capture." - demographics . . .

Success of various missions movements – (425), "Why were these movements successful, where they were successful? And why did it all collapse in recent decades? We can see from the above figures that the 1960s or thereabouts is a watershed moment in all three countries, and in fact in many others in the western world; what happened? And, of course, the great enigma of secularization theory remains the United States. Why does this society so flagrantly stand out from other Atlantic countries?"

vs. the identification of differentiation and privatization – (426), "A separation out and emancipation of secular spheres, like the state, the economy, and science, has undoubtedly occurred. But it doesn't follow at all "that the process of secularization would bring in its wake the privatization and, some added, the marginalization of religion in the modern world."" (cf. Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, 1994)

Problems of our views influencing our theories about secularization
428, "We don't just decide once and for all when we enter sociology class to leave out "values" at the door. They don't just enter as conscious premises which we can discount. They continue to shape our thought at a much deeper level, and it is only a continuing open exchange with those of different standpoints which will help us to correct some of the distortions they engender."

Foucault's "unthought"

Coming at the phenomena of religion from two angles at once:
  • beliefs and actions predicated on supernatural
  • transformational perspective (beyond ordinary human flourishing, ordinary self-giving . . .)

431, what exactly is the secularization thesis? - Taylor's three-storey dwelling:
  • ground floor – fact that belief and practice have declined
  • basement – how to explain (e.g. Bruce – differentiation, community, rationalization)
  • top storey – where has this left us today? (432), "Here we are in the domain that I have designated secularity 3, . . ."

Problem is how much of the building various theorists are concerned with when they speak of secularization

revisionists and the critique of sociology by history. Question of the place of the transformation perspective

433, "But with this kind of claim, we are already in the upper storey. It turns out that basement and higher floor are intimately linked; that is, that the explanation one gives for the declines registered by "secularization" relate closely to one's picture of the place of religion today."

The disappearance thesis and the epiphenomenal thesis – (433), "The first says that the independent motivation to religious belief and action . . . tends to disappear in conditions of modernity. The second says that in conditions of modernity (if not always), religious belief and action can only be epiphenomenal, that is functional to some distinct goals or purposes."

Taylor's responses
435, "I cannot see the "demand for religion" just disappearing like that. It seems to me that our situation (the perennial human situation?) is to be open to two solicitations. One (in our civilization, anyway) is the draw to a transformation perspective. The other comes from a congeries of resistances to this kind of solicitation." Christian and secular versions

Brief "take" on the last centuries

436, "This reading allows us to see certain things which the mainline reading occludes. First, it doesn't see the decline as linear, that is, the decline of one unchanging thing, . . ." continuity and discontinuity

436-37, "Sec- // ond, it allows us to appreciate that and how the forms of religion actually changed, and are changing again today."

437, "the present scene . . . is different and unrecognizable to any earlier epoch. It is marked by an unheard of pluralism of outlooks, religious and non- and anti-religious, in which the number of possible positions seems to be increasing without end." . . . "And as a consequence, the proportion of belief is smaller and that of unbelief is larger than ever before; and this is even more clearly the case, if you define religion in terms of the transformation perspective. . . ." Thus agree to decline . . . "But the interesting story is not simply one of decline, but also of a new placement of the sacred or spiritual in relation to individual and social life."

2. Restatement of history as an illustration of the interplay of the various factors involved

437, "An outrageously simplified potted history of the last two-and-some centuries."
- Ancien régime (AR – pre-Axial) – close connection with national and local community
- Reform – disruption of local forms, yet popular religion. Élites become detached from popular culture
- class conflict, along with urbanization . . .

443, "This is where the processes of urbanization and industrialization enter our explanatory picture. They further the process of disintegration of the ancien régime forms, partly just through dislocation and great transfers to areas where there were few churches, but more profoundly by takiing masses of people out of the parish context in which these forms had made sense."

oppression and alienation for the people, yet void – thus
444, "In late-nineteenth-century Europe, the gamut of choices had been crucially widened. Modalities of exclusive humanism were now options. And the often reactionary stance of the Church could only help to make them more plausible."

yet church not stay the same but adapts – (e.g. Catholic action movement) – (445), "Gradually content began to break through form."

3. The Age of Mobilization - just what Taylor means by mobilization

445, "it designates a process whereby people are persuaded, pushed, dragooned, or bullied into new forms of society, church, association."

no backdrop of easy connection between church and society
- earlier ancien régime tied up with enchanted world
- post Reformation – disenchantment from cosmos and polis
- then natural law and providential deism – further distancing, yet civil religions

The American example (448), "What continues is the importance of some form of the modern idea of moral order. It is this which gives the sense that Americans are still operating on the same principles as the Founders. The rift comes from the fact that what makes this order the right one is, for many though not by any means for all, no longer God's Providence; the order is grouunded in nature alone, or in some concept of civilization, or even in supposedly unchallengeable a priori principles, often inspired

by Kant. So that some Americans want to rescue the coonstitution from God, whereas others, with deeper historical roots, see this as doing violence to it."

448, "But the United States' path to modernity, although considered paradigmatic by many Americans, is in fact rather exceptional."

free church development (Troeltschian "sects") - the denomination.

450, "The denomination clearly belongs to the Age of Mobilization." . . . "The denominational imaginary made possible a flexibility unknown in most Continental societies."

treatment of revivals and the tensions between God's influence and our initiative (452) and the power of religious conversion (453)

453, "We have been describing two ways in which religious faith might re-establish itself within the Mobilization model, after the break with the ancien régime."
   • presence of God at the level of the whole society, which the society is undertaking to carry out
   • "free" churches offering mutual help toward God's will in society. Republic secures the freedom of the churches and churches sustain the Godly ethos

454, "So it is a feature of denominationalism that, just because one's own church does not include all the faithful, there is a sense of belonging to a wider, less structured whole which does." separates religion from state

Interpretation in light of Durkheim
   • paleo-Durkheimian – ontic dependence of state on God and higher times
   • neo-Durkheimian – God's design organizes things

455, "in "neo" societies, God is present because it is his Design around which society is organized."
        "belief is sustained by the "neo-Durkheimian" identification with the state." security and confidence

456, "The point I want to make about British and later American patriotism, based as it was at first on the sense of fulfilling god's design, is that national identity was based on a self-ascribed pre-eminence in realizing a certain civilizational superiority." - tougher when you're from Canada

centrality of mobilization for all of this – (458), "mobilization is inseparable from a (re)definition of identity."

4. More Specifically, what is the Age of Mobilization all about?

Differences between AR (ancien régime) and M (Age of Mobilization):

(i) AR based on pre-modern forms of order (cosmos, higher time); M based on Modern idea of order
(ii) AR forms pre-exist humans; M posits idea to be realized
(iii) AR forms are organic (orders, institutions, societies); M societies are "direct access" (citizens)
(iv) AR world is enchanted; move toward M involves greater and greater disenchantment

461, "But the transitions I have been describing suffice for my limited purposes here. These are negatively to cast down on the formerly dominant, unilinear secularization theory, which sees the retreat of faith as a steady function of certain modernizing trends, such as the class differentiation of society, or the movement out of the countryside into the cities." . . . "Positively, my aim is to suggest, in place of the supposed uniform and unilinear effect of modernity on religious belief and practice, another model, in which these changes do, indeed, frequently destabilize older forms, but where what follows depends heavily on what alternatives are available or can be invented out of the repertory of the populations concerned. The pattern of modern religious life under "secularization" is one of destabilization and recomposition, a process which can be repeated many times."

Various examples

468, "The various successful forms of faith in the age of mobilization combine these two strands; not only ethical/disciplinary, in which all (or most) partake, but also a series of special devotions, services, modes of prayer, etc., for those who from time to time feel the need for some special form of dedication."

the festive

471, "If we take my ideal type of Mobilization, and try to determine the period when it was more and more dominant, we can fix the limits of the Age of Mobilization from roughly 1800 to 1950 (perhaps more exactly 1960). If we survey this period, we can see religious forms everywhere suffering decay and loss, those of the ancien régime type; and almost everywhere too, new forms being developed which can fit the age."

Christian ghettos – Catholic groups outside Anglo-Saxon world

472, "Thus the powerful forms of faith wove four strands together in this age: spirituality, discipline, political identity, and an image of civilizational order." now mass phenomenon

472, "But these tightly organized churches, often suspicious of outsiders, with their strongly puritanical codes, their inherent links, of whatever sort, to political identities, and their claims to civilizational order, were perfectly set up for a precipitate fall in the next age which was beginning to dawn at mid-century. To this I now turn."

Chapter 13 – The Age of Authenticity
5. Introducing the Age of Authenticity (see Taylor's *The Ethics of Authenticity*, 1992)

473, "I believe, along with many others, that our North Atlantic civilization has been undergoing a cultural revolution in recent decades." 60s as hinge,

"expressive individualism" - (473), "What is new is that this kind of self-orientation seems to have become a mass phenomenon." various causes

vs. mere egoism or return to hedonism   (474), "I think this misses an important point. Egoism and the mere search for pleasure (whatever exactly these amount to) may play a larger or smaller role in the motivation of different individuals, but a large-scale shift in general understandings of the good requires some new understanding of the good."

Consumer revolution (475), "if we move from these external facts about post-war consumerism to the self-understandings that went along with them, we see a steady spread of what I have called the culture of "authenticity." . . . "This had been the standpoint of many intellectuals and artists during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. . . . But it is only in the era after the Second World War, that this ethic of authenticity begins to shape the outlook of society in general."

Prehistory, revolts against divisions within societies and ourselves, reactions within and without

culture wars, American obsession with "rights" (478), "The reduced and simplified fragment becomes the limit of our moral world, the basis of an all-encompasing slogan" [EBH – isn't this the way when something that was the preserve of the élite is transmitted to popular culture?]

480, "But what emerges through all the muddle and evasion is that there has been a real value shift here."

What are the consequences of the turn for our social imaginary? (481)

spoken elsewhere about modern horizontal forms of social imaginary:
- economy
- public sphere
- sovereign people

but we can also add:
- space of fashion

481, "The general structure I want to draw from this example of the space of fashion is that of a horizontal, simultaneous mutual presence, which is not that of a common action, but rather of a mutual display."

common emotion, the festive again

483, "Which is why some have seen these moments a among the new forms of religion in our world." [EBH – cultural liturgies] . . . "Now consumer culture, expressivism and spaces of mutual display connect in our world to produce their own kind of synergy." [the mall] . . "Modern consumer society is inseparable from the construction of spaces of display." - reactions as well

How else is the advance of expressive individualism altering our social imaginary? (483)

- styles and the displacement of idntity-connections with large-scale collective agencies (nations, churches (large?), political parties . . .)
- order of mutual benefit strengthened – different form, "The sin which is not tolerated is intolerance."
- The heart of this revolution lies in sexual mores

486, "concentrate on . . . the imagined place of the sacred, in the widest sense. Drawing an ideal type of this new social imaginary of expressive individualism, we could say that it was quite non-Durkheimian."

- paleo-Durkheimian – [ontic dependence of state on God and higher times] – entailed belonging to a church coextensive with society

- neo-Durkheimian – [God's design organizes things] – denominational choice though still connection with broader "church" and political entity with providential role

in both of these some link between adhering to God and belonging to state
varieties of coersion and sense of self in paleo- and neo-Durkheimian perspective. Self-orientation in expressivist outlook

487, "In the new expressivist dispensation, there is no necessary embedding of our link to the sacred in any particular broader framework, whether "church" or state."

- post-Durkheimian – uncoupled from our political allegiance

Yet now embattled link between faith and civilizational order – notes
[a] Logic of modern subjectification and the buffered self – and the movement to feelings. (489), "What is needed is a subtler language which can make manifest the higher or divine. But this language requires for its force that it resonate with the writer or reader. Getting assent to some external formula is not the main thing, but being able to gererate the moving insight into higher reality is what is important." Deeply felt personal insight . . . "I believe that the present expressive outlook comes from that shift having penetrated in some general form deep into our culture."

[b] (489), "Of course, this understanding of the place and nature of spirituality has pluralism built into it, not just pluralism within a certain doctrinal framework, but unlimited." (490), "The a priori principle, that a valid answer to the religious quest must meet either the paleo- or neo-Durkheimian conditions (a church or a "church" and/or society) has been abandoned in the new dispensation. The spiritual as such is no longer intrinsically related to society." [EBH – no socially-recognized form necessary]

various ways of working this out in practice in consumer culture

How to understand the impact of this whole shift on the place of religion in public space? (491)

491-92, "My hypothesis is that the post-war slide in our social imaginary more and more into a post-Durkheimian age has destabilized and undermined the various // Durkheimian dispensations. This has had the effect of either gradually releasing people to be recruited into the fractured culture, or in the case where the new consumer culture has quite dislocated the earlier outlook, of explosively expelling people into this fractured world." (community disintegrates, factory closes . . .)

But there is more than this. The expressive revolution has also undermined the link between Christian faith and civilizational order. (492)

discontent with religious repression was "intensified by the cultural revolution of the 1960s" (492)
493, "The pursuit of happiness has come to seem not only not to need a restrictive sexual ethic and the disciplines of deferred gratification, but actually to demand their transgression in the name of self-fulfillment."

6. The Post-60s Alienation from Traditional Christian Faith

495, "Thus the generations which have been formed in the cultural revolution of the 1960s are in some respects deeply alienated from a strong traditional model of the Christian faith in the West."

496, "John Bossy has argued that in the medieval understanding of the seven deadly sins, the sins of the spirit (pride, envy, anger) were seen as more grievous than those of the flesh (gluttony, lechery, sloth: avarice could be put in either column). But during the Catholic reformation, emphasis came to be more and more on concupiscence as the crucial obstacle to sanctity."

motivations of fear and example (497) . . . "What emerges from all of this is what we might call "moralism", that is, the crucial importance given to a certain code in our spiritual lives. . . . This is perhaps not an outlook which it is easy to square with a reading of the New Testament, but it nevertheless achieved a kind of hegemony across broad reaches of the Christian church in the modern era."

Sexual purity, along with obedience, were therefore given extraordinary salience

Review of the features of the sexual revolution

changing conception [EBH - pun intended] of human flourishing, medicalization and "science," lots of new social factors (women in work-force . . .)

502, "All this shows that the sexual revolution was an integral part of the 60s, as I defined them above; that is, that it was moved by the same complex of moral ideas, in which discovering one's authentic identity and demanding that it be recognized (strand 4) was connected to the goals of equality (strand 2), and of the rehabilitation of the body and sensuality, the overcoming of the divisions between mind and body, reason and feeling (strands 1 and 3). We cannot simply treat it as an outbreak of hedonism, . . ."

502, "However, once again as in the earlier discussion, we have to recognize that the moral landscape has changed." . . .

503, "Once again, the eighteenth century identification of God's will with certain supposed human goods is operating as a great engine of secularization (engendering secularity 2).
        The repellant effect of this fused vision is clearly that at its maximum in the Age of Authenticity, with a widespread popular culture in which individual self-realization and sexual fulfillment are interwoven."

and yet --- (504), "What Vatican rule-makers and secularist ideologies unite in not being able to see, is that there are more ways of being a Catholic Christian than either have yet imagined."

Chapter 14 – Religion Today

7. What is the spiritual life that emerges? [the top storey]

505, "So the dominant religious forms of the Mobilization Age have been destabilized by the current cultural revolution, even as those of the ancien régime were by the onset of the Age of Mobilization."

post-war prosperity in America – also religion

506, "The three sides of this triangle mutually supported each other: the family was the matrix in which the young were brought up to be good citizens and believing worshippers; religion was the source of

the various values that animated both family and society; and the state was the realization and bulwark of the values central to both family and churches." . . . "This tight interweaving of family, religion, and state is the more remarkable in that, unknown to anyone at the time, it was about to suffer simultaneous blows to each of its constituent parts." . . .

covered break-down of religious forms (negative side). Now positive characterization

What is the spiritual life like which emerges from the expressive revolution?

- More direct experience of the sacred
- authenticity - *my* path . . .
- heirs of the expressive revolution (Peggy Lee)
- search for health
- spirituality opposed to religion – this search is not just flat and shallow – moreover

510, "I insist on this point because in a way this whole book is an attempt to study the fate in the modern West of religious faith in a strong sense. This strong sense I define, to repeat, by a double criterion: the belief in a transcendent reality, on one hand, and the connected aspiration to a transformation which goes beyond ordinary human flourishing on the other."

discussion of devout humanism (Bossuet, Fénelon . . .)
mention of Wuthnow's "dwelling" and "seeking" transition [EBH – note that he will later mention Wuthnow's category of "practice"]

8. What are the Features of this New Spiritual Landscape?

1. breaking down of barriers (deconstruction of ghetto walls)

2. decline -

513, "On top of this [general decline in numbers . . .] more and more people adopt what would earlier have been seen as untenable positions, e.g., they consider themselves Catholics while not accepting many crucial dogmas, or they combine Christianity with Buddhism, or they pray while not being certain they believe." - (514), assembling their own personal outlook

Retreat of Christendom
514, "What lies behind these figures and trends? We cannot understand our present situation by a single ideal type, but if we understand ourselves to be moving away from an Age of Mobilization and more into an Age of Authenticity, then we can see this whole move as in a sense a retreat of Christendom. . . . But what I mean by the retreat of Christendom is that it will be less and less common for people to be drawn into or kept within a faith by some strong political or group identity, or by the sense that they are sustaining a socially essential ethic."

 A bit of Taylor's "solution" enters now -

Where will access to practice and deeper engagement lie now?

515, "Now if we don't accept the view that the human aspiration to religion will flag, and I do not, then where will the access lie to practice of and deeper engagement with religion? The answer is the various forms of spiritual practice to which each is drawn in his/her own spiritual life."

much movement between forms of practices

516, "These connections, sacramental or through a common practice, are obviously still powerful in the modern world."

- possibly lower rate of inter-generational continuity of religious adherents
- new sense of pilgrim
- festive
- importance of practice (here citing Wuthnow)

on diffusive Christianity, hinterland and expectations of commitments

Age of Mobilization moments still exist further in margins (Diana's funeral . . .)

521, "So it appears that the religious or spiritual identity of masses of people still remains defined by religious forms from which they normally keep themselves at a good distance."

9. The American Exception – Why doesn't America fit the secularization theories easily?

Attempts:
(1) Bruce – immigrant contexts
(2) Hierarchical nature of European societies
525, "The capacity of élites to set the tone of a whole society, to define its "religious imaginary", may turn out to be a very important factor." [EBH – then why not earlier changes to the mass?]

(3) American is neo-Durkheimian
525, "But perhaps the heart of the American exception is that this society is the only one that from the beginning . . . was entirely within the neo-Durkheimian mould."
(4) Taylor's suggestion – 60s destabilize, ethic of authenticity undermined neo-Durkheimian alignments and undercut faith and sexual morality

526, "So our question can be put in this way: why did this destabilization give rise to a decline of religious allegiance and practice, even to some extent in religious belief, in Europe and not in the U.S.A.?"

character of patriotism in USA, World War his UK more seriously (yet family-religion-state after Vietnam and such)

528, "So in terms of my discussion a few paragraphs back, the traditional American synthesis of "civil religion", a strong neo-Durkheimian identity, originally around a non-denominational Christianity, with a strong connection to civilizational order, is still in a "hot" phase, unlike its British counterpart."

(5) More models in USA
528, "That [1-4] provides one half of the answer. The other half is that, for those who are willing to move to a post-Durkheimian stance, and are critical of traditional sexual morality, the history of

American religious pluralism affords them the model of numerous options of more personalized and experimental religious forms." . . . (529), "Their whole religious culture was in some way prepared for the Age of Authenticity, . . ."

10. Summary and Conclusion

530, "Perhaps I can try to gather together some of the threads of this discussion. I have been trying to describe how we got from the (partial) élite unbelief of the eighteenth century to the (wider but still partial) unbelief, but also disaffection and distance from religion, in the twenty-first century."

Criticisms of some forms of secularization theory – because (530), "I hold that religious longing, . . . remains a strong independent source of motivation in modernity."

- dissipation of the enchanted cosmos
- exclusive humanism
- multiplication of options
- neo-Durkheimian approaches
- Age of Mobilization
- decline of sense that civilization had to be Christian in order to be ordered

531, "It is a pluralist world, in which many forms of belief and unbelief jostle, and hence fragilize each other. . . . So over-all fragilization has increased."

level playing field?

532, "The outcome of this pluralism and mutual fragmentation will often be a retreat of religion from the public square." or perhaps the space to be "free to speak their minds."

Positive features
- movement toward "more personal, committed forms of religious devotion and practice."
- disadvantaged by memory of past forms, yet nagging dissatisfactions with the modern moral order
- for example the "just Christians" in Russia and "minimal religion"
- likewise Taylor speaks of a "post-secular" Europe

534, "I rather mean a time in which the hegemony of the mainstream master narrative of secularization will be more and more challenged." (535), "This I think is now happening."

535, "In any case, we are just at the beginning of a new age of religious searching, whose outcome no one can foresee."

PART FIVE – CONDITIONS OF BELIEF

Chapter 15 – The Immanent Frame (on some of the themes of this chapter, see also Charles Taylor, *The Varieties of Religion Today*)

Just a note – from this point on in the book Taylor takes a more open approach to the structure of the text. He introduces themes and leaves them for a rabbit trail, only to return to the theme later on. I will try to identify where Taylor returns to themes as I find significant treatments of topics.

1. Review and Introduction to the Immanent Frame

539, "In the previous chapters, I have been trying to give an answer [to secularity 3] in terms of the story of how we got to where we are. But "secularization" stories also involve some picture of where this is, of the spiritual shape of the present age (the third story of such theories, as I described in chapter 12 [see p. 431 for the start of his discussion of the three-storey dwelling]). That is what I would like to address in this chapter."
      We can assemble the pieces of an answer, if we pick up some of the themes that have been discussed in earlier chapters, and lay out the interlocking and mutually reinforcing changes discussed there."

Buffered self, interiorization, inner depths, discipline, intimate space, individual, process of Reform, responsibility, secular time, instrumental stance

542, "So the buffered identity of the disciplined individual moves in a constructed social space, where instrumental rationality is a key value, and time is pervasively secular. All of this makes up what I call the "immanent frame". There remains to add just one background idea: that this frame constitutes a "natural" order, to be contrasted to a "supernatural" one, an "immanent" world, over against a possible "transcendent" one."

543, "And so we come to understand our lives as taking place within a self-sufficient immanent order; or better a constellation of orders, cosmic, social, and moral."

The social order [for example?]

543, "The immanent order can thus slough off the transcendent." - permits closure without demanding it (544)

2. Theist and Non-theist Experience in an Open Immanent Frame [open to something beyond as opposed to being closed to this possibility]

544, "First of all, let me explore the main motivations that people feel on one side or the other [of closure]. Let's start by asking: how does the immanent frame remain open?"

Civil religion and other ways to connect God to the frame. Connections can be broken or entrenched. Consubstantiality

545, "This kind of consubstantiality is one, positive set of ways in which the immanent frame may be lived as inherently open to transcendence. But it [the consubstantility?] also may be present for us negatively, as something whose lack we feel." - no room for a greater sense of the whole

Reactions
  • remain within the immanent order and look for higher order (Rousseau, Marx)
  • remain within the immanent order and reject "higher" order (immanent counter-Enlightenment)
  • press towards some recognition of transcendence

3. Forces or Arguments Pushing Toward Closure Today

536, And what pushes to closure, when we go in that direction?

- identifies in Christianity a danger for the goods of the modern moral order (demand allegiance, split order, reach beyond human flourishing will distract . . .)
- menaced by fanaticism
- supposed rejection, or relegation, of the sensual (and denial of our sense of belonging to nature)
- problem with mysteries (or sense of mystery before nature and vast genesis)
- sense of feeling comfortable within the immanent frame (though others don't)
- sense of power and control

548, "And then the colossal success of modern natural science and the associated technology can lead us to feel that it unlocks all mysteries, that it will ultimately explain everything . . ."

548, "I have been describing here the basic motivations of the two great polar positions. But we must also remember that there always have been a great many people who have been cross-pressured between the two basic-orientations; who want to respect as much as they can the "scientific" shape of the immanent order, as they have been led to see it; or who fear the effect of religious "fanaticism"; but who still cannot help believing that there is something more than the merely transcendent." - also not just danger from religion but also from non-religious threats

Varieties (see Taylor's *Varieties*)

549, "We don't stand there, because not only is the immanent frame itself not usually, or even mainly a set of *beliefs* which we entertain about our predicament, however it may have started out; rather it is the sensed context in which we develop our beliefs; but in the same way, one or other of these [beliefs and context] takes on the immanent frame, as open or closed, has usually sunk to the level of such an unchallenged framework, something we have trouble often thinking ourselves outside of, even as an imaginative exercise."

Wittgenstein's idea of a "picture" (cf. *PI* #115.)

4. Responses to Objections #1: The Immanent Frame Demands a Closed Reading

550, "But my whole reading here will be challenged. I have distinguished the immanent frame, on one hand, and two equally possible spins", open and closed, on the other.

Objection #1 – (550), "Some people will undoubtedly feel that the immanent frame calls out for one reading

only one natural – due to hegemony of reading

Response – (550), "By contrast, my understanding of the immanent frame is that, properly understood, it allows of both readings, without compelling us to either." Going either way requires "leap of faith"

550, "What pushes us one way or the other is what we might describe as our over-all take on human life, and its cosmic and (if any) spiritual surroundings."

hunch, anticipatory confidence, faith – (551), "both open and closed stances involve a step beyond available reasons into the realm of anticipatory confidence."

551, "The force of the secularist spin can be understood in terms of what I will call "closed world structures" (CWSs), that is, ways of restricting our grasp of things which are not recognized as such." [as closed?]

551, Now discuss "three broad categories of these [CWSs], which go a long way to explaining the unjustified force of the mainstream account of secularization, as well as the disinterest in and contempt for religion which frequently accompanies it [accompanies the mainstream account of secularization]."

But before I discuss these -

Objection #2 [or another presentation of Objection #1] – (551), "Surely, our modern man-made world declares the absence of God."

Response - cf. A. N. Wilson's portrait of the modern conditions
  • meaning of city actually more drastic (not just financial buildings instead of cathedral)

552, "But the implications of Wilson's passage, that modern conditions yield an experience of godlessness which secularist theories just ratify, is a bit too quick; and for more than just one reason."
  • overlooks other experiences of modernity – neo-Durkheim politics, discipline from faith . . .
  • see apparent godlessness from modern conditions as sign of serious lack ("transcendent power which has been neglected"), not sign of actual non-existence of transcendence.
  • Confusion of disenchantment with the end of religion
    ○ rather we should see change in religious life – less embodied
    ○ (554), "official Christianity has gone through what we call an "excarnation""

Response – (555), So, in one sense it is true that living within this frame pushes us to the closed perspective. But this is the sense in which living within the frame is living according to the norms and practices it incorporates. However, I have been arguing all along that the actual experience of living within Western modernity tends to awaken protest, resistances of various kinds." [meaning that the push to a closed position is not as clear-cut as some might wish to claim]

555, "It is not just that the frame doesn't as such tip us in one direction or the other, that is its effect on each person will be coloured by the orientation they have been led to develop. But even when they come to feel it as obviously supporting closure, this doesn't constitute a valid argument." - not rational grounding, but "spin"

5. Responses to Objections #2: The "Closed" World is Obvious – God is Dead

Objection #3 – Closed world is obvious

556, "I want now to examine the illusion of the rational "obviousness" of the closed perspective." the construction of horizontal/closed (Heideggerian "worlds")

may seem like only one reading, but (556), "It is truer to say that in our world, a whole gamut of positions, from the most militant atheism to the most orthodox traditional theisms, passing through every possible position on the way, are represented and defended somewhere in our society."

Fragilization – (556), "The existence of an alternative fragilizes each context, that is, makes its sense of the thinkable/unthinkable uncertain and wavering."
    This fragilization is then increased by the fact that great numbers of people are not firmly embedded in any such context, but but are puzzled, cross-pressured, or have constituted by bricolage a sort of median position."

557, "What I want to try is to articulate some of the worlds from within which the believing option seems strange and unjustifiable." [CWS types] – not just epistemology but structure which "controls the way people think, argue, infer, make sense of things." - involving priority relations

Example - Epistemological picture itself functioning as CWS – review assumptions of modern epistemology
    Contestation of these assumptions (1)- (4)

559, "We can learn something general about the way CWS operate, suffer attack, and defend themselves, from this example. From within itself, the epistemological picture seems unproblematic. . . .
    Seen from the deconstruction, this is a most massive self-blindness." (560), "Its "neutrality" appears bogus."

From those within the CWS – a kind of naturalization of a way of looking at things [this is the *natural* way to see it, particularly in light of scientific development . . .] - subtraction theory.

Objection #4 – God is Dead

560, "But to develop this idea I should move to another, richer CWS, or constellation of CWS. It is what people often gesture at with an expression like the "death of God"."

conditions of modern society leave us nothing we can believe in beyond human – what conditions? (science [i] and contemporary moral experience [ii]) [to be covered here and in section **#6f.**]

[I] Science -
  • religion emanates from a lack of courage
  • calls for self-mutilation
  • imposes the same on others

562-63, Taylor - not scientific-epistemic self-evidence, but "one moral outlook gave way to another"
564, "So I am less than fully convinced by the major thrust of the "death of God" account of the rise of modern secularity; its account in other words of the modern conditions of belief. What makes belief problematic, often difficult and full of doubts, is not simply "science"."
    (565), "It should be obvious that there are parallels between my critique of the "official story" here, and the deconstruction of epistemology. In both cases, what is being claimed is that some move is being passed off as a simple discovery, which in fact is much more like a new construction: a change that involves also a new sense of our identity and our place in the world, with its implicit values, ratther

than simply registering observable reality." . . . "For the critic, who sees all too well how ill-grounded some of these steps are, the crucial role of the construal of agency becomes much more salient."

6. Further Responses to the Death of God Objection – mostly on Moral Experience [ii]

arguments from science are not convincing – so why does this work? - They seem convincing. (569), "So my contention is that the power of materialism today comes not from the scientific "facts", but has rather to be explained in terms of the power of a certain package uniting materialism with a moral outlook, the package we would call "atheistic humanism", or exclusive humanism."

[ii] Contemporary moral experience – [later – see pp. 575, 595 – called "subtraction story" 572]

convergence of fundamentalists and atheists

571, "The element of "discovery" seems unchallengeable, because the underlying construction is pushed out of sight and forgotten."

572, "The logic of the subtraction story is something like this: once we slough off our concern with serving God, or attending to any other transcendent reality, what we're left with is human good, and that is what modern societies are concerned with. But this radically under-describes what I'm calling modern humanism. That I am left with only human concerns doesn't tell me to take universal human welfare as my goal; nor does it tell me that freedom is important, or fulfillment, or equality. Just being confined to human goods could just as well find expression in my concerning myself exclusively with my own material welfare, or that of my family or immediate milieu. The in fact very exigent demands of universal justice and benevolence which characterize modern humanism can't be explained just by the subtraction of earlier goals and allegiances."

Also (573), "This excessive reliance on a subtraction story is related to the object of my eearlier complaint, in the first chapter, viz., that this kind of account gives too much place to changes in belief, as against those in experience and sensibility. . . . see them in the context of the great cultural changes, the new understandings of self, agency, time, society which Western modernity has generated." - shift of "master narratives"

573, "These [master narratives] have come under some considerable attack in our time, are are thought to be (ideally) a thing of the past. But my contention will be that, so far from being passé, these master narratives are essential to our thinking. . . We need to be lucid about what we are doing, and ready to debate the ones we're relying on."

573, "I have been tracing the outlines of one such narrative, an account of the coming of modern secularity, which in its general form is widely and deeply implanted in modern humanist culture." Four connected facts: death of God (no one can sincerely believe now), subtraction theory, origins of religious belief, (d) recession of religion in the face of science, technology, rationality

7. Further Responses to the Death of God Objection – On Our Socio-Political Condition [iii]

575, "Coming of age", subtraction, these are two faces f this powerful contemporary story. But it is much richer than these, and it would be useful to explore a bit further other facets." two widespread and rhetorically convincing narrations – now accepted as unchallenged common sense and background "pictures"

[iii] Social and Political Condition -

Background of the modern disconnection from networks - "sociability of strangers"

575-76, "The actual account of the transition as it has been lived, is often a story of great moral enthusiasm at a discovery, at a liberation from a narrower world of closer, claustrophobic relations, involving excessive control and invidious distinctions; and at the same time it has been lived as a liberation into a new broader space, in which masses of people come together outside of the old distinctions, and meet as fellow citizens, as fellow human beings, in a new human enterprise, like that of the nation, or the revolutionary party, the "party of mankind". We mustn't forget, of course, that from the other // side, he party of those who resisted these changes, it has been experienced as a catastrophic break-down of the most crucial and elementary social bond."

French Revolution, youth cultures, - discussion of power (mentions Bataille)

578, "Before justice could be conceived in the modern way, which makes, for example, Rawls' work seem so truistic for so many contemporaries, this whole way of understanding society had to give way before the modern one." Pre-Axial to Axial to modern

Four benchmarks of the new order: liberty, empower, mutual benefit, reason, equality, rights

various Christian approaches to the benchmarks (579), "So the story of the rise of modern social spaces doesn't need to be given an inti-religious spin." Yet direction and energy when it goes this way

8. Further Responses to the Death of God Objection – On Autonomous Self [iv – cf. p. 590]

580, "The story line here is this: once human beings took their norms, their goods, their standards of ultimate value from an authority outside of themselves; from God, or the gods, or the nature of Being or the cosmos. But then they came to see that these higher authorities were their own fictions, and they realized that they had to establish their norms and values for themselves, on their own authority . . . come to dictate the ultimate values by which they live."

580, no longer from an authority outside us, "but rather from our own scientific investigations."

outside this is a normative abyss, past orientation vs. future and revolutionary perspective on this

Camus (*Plague*) and responses:
- negate absurdity
- rehabilitate projections or devise new ones
- downplay happiness (denying, minimizing fulfillments)

Camus and Sartre break (provisional limited happiness or cause)

point is that here meaning is up to us – face loss of meaningful

589, "The narratives of self-authorization, when examined more closely, are far from self-evident; and yet their assuming axiomatic status in the thinking of many people, is one facet of a powerful and widespread CWS, imposing a closed spin on the immanent frame we all share."

589-90 summary (590), "I have articulated these facets in some detail, partly in order to show that they function as unchallenged axioms, rather than as unshakable arguments, and that they rely on very shaky assumptions, are often grounded on illegitimate naturalizations of what are in fact profound cultural mutations, and in general survive largely because they end up escaping examination in the climage in which they are taken as the undeniable framework for any argument." - generate anticipatory confidence

yet religious options persevere. Why? (reviews Renan, Bruce)

592, "Religion remains ineradicably on the horizon of areligion; and vice versa. This is another indication that the "official story" needs to be understood on a deeper level, as I have been suggesting above."

10. Getting Beyond to the Middle

Jamesian open space to feel the pull in both directions [cf. 549]. (592), "To stand here is to be at the mid-point of the cross-pressures that define our culture."

two versions
- some want to opt for impersonal and feel the loss
- some search for transcendent

593, "Confidence here must remain always anticipatory. Parallel to the continuing regret of ex-believers is this sense that the struggle for belief is never definitively won."

Chapter 16 – Cross Pressures

1. How Cross Pressures Work

Review – three-storey world, why modern uses the basement it does, immanent frame assumed for moderns, but not demanding closed world system or invoking transcendent. Destabilization and recomposition, mutual fragilization,

595, "The whole culture experiences cross pressures, between the draw of the narratives of closed immanence on one side, and the sense of their inadequacy on the other, strengthened by encounter with existing milieux or religious practice, or just be some intimations of the transcendent."

Materialism – M1 mechanistic explanation; M2 motivational materialism

science – [EBH – more research these days form + psych that critiques the "modern" views here]

- It takes courage
- religion turns us from fulfillment (note various debates here)

Critiques – (1) agents, (2) spiritual objection, (3) aesthetic

597, "A major question for all positions which take their stand in immanence, whether materialistic or not, is: how can one account for the specific force of creative energy, or ethical demands, or for the power of artistic experience, without speaking in terms of some transcendent being or force which interpallates us?"

597-98, "But if frequently happens that those // who object to it [MMO] also reject this orthodoxy [of religion. Hence the cross pressure." -

hesitation, other lines of cross pressure

3. The Debate: Fullness and Ethical Predicament

600, "In these cross-pressured fields, what is the debate ultimately about?"

600, "The swirling debate about belief and unbelief, as well as different versions of each, can therefore be seen as a debate about what real fullness consists in." - cf. the Augustinian critique of the pagan life of warrior fame and glory

602, "We can see that the debate here is about what has been called "the ends of life."" - an ethical debate

603, "But there I a sense in which the ethical debate can't be entered into in its purest for in these cases. Our attachment to a certain ethical definition of fullness is bolstered by our belonging to a broader society to which we sense an emotional allegiance, and this brings other motivations into play, those of identity pride, for instance which may be alien to the ethic which supposedly defines us." [EBH – see *Sources* for more on this] – problems in certain cases with why hold beliefs

604, "I want to stress again that the crucial debate in modern culture turns not just on rival notions of fullness, but on conceptions of our ethical predicament." Not just fullness, but (604-05):

(a) motivations which carry us toward fulfillment [note – later Taylor speaks of "moral sources which can enable us to live up to our very strong universal commitments"]
(b) motivations which bar our way
(c) how integral fullness achieved
(d) other questions – can (b) be vanquished? Transformed? Beyond?
(e) what are the costs of denying or over-riding (b)? Does this mutilate human life?

Examples of how this works with Taylor's critiques – aesthetics, human rights, regard for body and sexuality (a brief note on violence p. 612)

Longer excursus on body and sexuality

612, "In our day, modern unbelief often reacts to the wound by taking up the cause of "paganism". It defends desire against the Christian demand for transformation." - deeply excarnated today

More recent history – Latin Christendom

613, "I have been trying to put the aspiration to wholeness, and to the rescue of the body, in the context of this longue durée of our religious history. But I want now to place it in relation to the shorter history which has been the main subject of this book, the various movements of Reform in Latin Christendom."
        Ritual and forms of cenobitic life, monastic practice and elite

caricature of modern Western religions

615, "But because there is something in the actual Reform of Latin Christendom which has pushed this excarnation farther than ever before in human history, we can see both why the aspiration to overcome it must be an invitation to struggle; and also why this overcoming is so differently understood."

Thus (616), "It is easy to understand how the hole for wholeness and the rescue of the body has been used in the struggle between faith and unbelief."
note 1960s harmony within each and among all

617, "We can see from this example of the ideal of wholeness how issues [issues related to our sense of ethical predicament] of ranges (c) to (e) in our list are crucial, that is questions about whether this ideal can be integrally reached, about the motives which stand in our way, and about the possible costs of trying to attain it. We will be looking at these in a more acute form in the next chapter."

Chapter 14 – Dilemmas 1

i. Humanism and "Transcendence"

Note – Taylor here wants to illustrate the cross pressures, to show more clearly how both religious and non-religious struggle with various concerns and forces in the midst of an immanent frame. As Taylor writes on p. 726-727, summarizing what he was trying to accomplish in chapters 14-15: " . . . I dealt with a number of dilemmas and demands which both faith and exclusive humanism have to deal with. These demands include: finding the moral sources which can enable us to live up to our very strong universal commitments to human rights and well being; and finding how to avoid the turn to violence which returns uncannily and often unnoticed in the "higher" forms of life which have supposedly set it aside definitively. Rather than one side clearly possessing the answers // that the other one lacks, we find rather that both face the same issues, and each with some difficulty."

618, "I will start by examining how the aspiration to rehabilitate the body and desire figures in an accusation against faith, and more particularly Christian faith, that it intrinsically and by its very nature frustrates this aspiration."- more than what seems

1. The Background: Goodness and the Therapeutic Turn

sickness vs. evil/sin (620), "So the therapeutic turn, the move from a hermeneutic of sin, evil, or spiritual misdirection, has at best ambiguous results for human dignity."

622, "So the spiritual or ethical perspective allows for, even requires the diagnosis of pathologies."

623, "The therapeutic approach disambiguates the complex, contradictory nature of evil, which does indeed involve a lesser capacity, but is always also the condition of a responsible agent. This disambiguation is supposed to be a clear step forward; but in fact it introduces us into a field of dilemmas, because the reality itself is complex, ambiguous."

2. The Case Against Christianity – It Hampers Fulfillment

623, "Against this background, I want to look at the case against Christianity, that it denies or hampers fulfillment." yet recognize paradox – religion accused of both – (624), "A better way of formulating

things would be to say, not that Christianity falls under both criticisms, but rather that it is the scene of an internal struggle of interpretations, whereby some seek to avoid one, but thereby fall more directly under the other, and others do the reverse."

(A) *One side of the critique – The warning against transcendence (and for ordinary passion and fulfillment while affirming a high moral calling)* - Martha Nussbaum
- futile and self-defeating
- damages us; unfits us for human fulfillment by inducing hate where it shouldn't be

Taylor's response (627), "I want to take up the issues in two phases: first looking at the idea(s) of "transcending humanity", and the extent to which we can or want to repudiate them as such; and then later examining the place of Christianity in this whole debate."

627, "Can we just renounce the aspiration to transcend, and return to "immanent" life?"

response to Nussbaum

630, here he brings up the issue of war. "Or take another case. We have been engaged in this century with attempts to establish a lasting peace through some world order. But war has been the occasion, as well of unspeakable horrors, of actions of great nobility." - how address this dual character?

631, "But if we don't renounce it [aspiration for fuller love], then our response to this cramped, desire-obsessed mode of spirituality has to be as nuanced as that to its polar adversary above, and similarly threefold: (a) of course, we have to say that and where it's wrong, but (b) we have to acknowledge that it rises partly out of a genuine and valuable aspiration, one to a fuller love, and thus (c) we cannot simply condemn it root and branch, as though it could be undiscriminatingly destroyed and rooted out; we have in fact to overcome it while preserving what is valuable in its roots."

632, anti-transcendent humanism which set the bar high

(B) "Tragic" objections – Neitzsche

against modern humanism's normalizing mutuality and reduction of aggression . . .

also against the idea of happiness as fulfillment (635), "For Neitzscheans, as for those who believe themselves to have grounds in biology and the theory of evolution for seeing aggression, or gender difference, or hierarchy. As deeply rooted in our natures, harmony will be unattainable, and it is even a kind of culpable weakness to believe in it or strive for it."

636, "Now here the argument shows a strange cross-over. When Neitzscheans reproach Christians for refusing to see how much humans cannot but affirm themselves through aggression, because they are so attached to a cleaned-up, "spiritualized" picture of the human potential . . ."

3. A Multi-Cornered Perspective

636, "I want to offer another framework to understand these struggles, not as a struggle between two protagonists, but rather as a three-cornered, even perhaps four-cornered battle. . . . There are secular humanists, there are neo-Neitzscheans, and there are those who acknowledge some good beyond life."

637, fourth party when we see that acknowledgers of transcendence are divided – secular humanism is mistake or providential

Further open the question of our "perennial human susceptibility to be fascinated by death and violence" (639), "What it might mean, however, is that the only way fully to escape the draw towards violence lies somewhere in the turn to transcendence, that is through the full-hearted love of some good beyond life." (mentions Girard)

4. Maximal Demand

ii. Against Mutilation

divisions in camp of unbelief – unresolved dilemmas

(639), They arise from that crucial complex of issues for any conception of the human ethical predicament that we identified in the last chapter [604-05]: whether its notion of fullness is integrally realizable, whether the obstacles to it, the negative motivations can be fully overcome; and if not, whether over-riding them involves and unacceptable sacrifice (issues (c), (d), and (e))."

basic form of the tension – (639-40), "how to define our highest spiri- // tual or moral aspirations for human beings, while showing a path to the transformation involved which doesn't crush, mutilate, or deny what is essential to our humanity? Let us call this the "maximal demand"."

contradictory accusations against Christianity, examples of various arguments back and forth – can exclusive humanism meet the maximal demand?

5. Christianity and the Maximal Demand

the many-cornered playing field

Christians don't really "have the solution" - problematic – transformation, sacrifice, desires

646, "In order to cast further light here, we have to look back into the murky process whereby the Christian revelation emerged from and partly rejected earlier understandings of sacrifice and divine violence."

(A) The charge [of Christians mutilating ordinary human desires] seems undeniable [Note – (B) appears on p. 656, regarding the parallels between believers and unbelievers]. Here at (A), Taylor wants to demonstrate the dilemma for believers. At (B) he broadens this to show that unbelievers face similar dilemmas.

647, Responses: still the turbulence (eliminate or celebrate), human sacrifice

648, "So religion since way back has been involved with sacrifice and mutilation . . . offering our substance to God . . . "identifying them with the divine, or internalizing their numinous power, or both.
        But there has also been a counter-movement. False gods, inappropriate placating. Spiritualized sacrifice . . . now to exclusive humanism which extends critique to religion "a false spiritual perfectionism which sacrifices real, healthy, breathing, loving human beings enjoying their normal fulfillment on the altars of false Gods."

Moderns can't internalize because the idea of modern flourishing has "no place for violence and rage, but only for pacific mutual benefit." (649) But also no place for divine violence. "A God who purposes nothing but our flourishing couldn't want to inflict this. It would make no sense." Then problems even thinking of God demanding sacrifice of Christ . . . (650), "And hence what was for a long time and remains for many the heart of Christian piety and devotion: love and gratitude at the suffering and sacrifice of Christ, seems incomprehensible, or even repellent and frightening to many."

the problems of Christ's suffering – all about human flourishing? images and metaphors, need a range (652), Christ's reaction to violence not counter-resistance, but violence turned around through transformational

655, "This modern Christian consciousness thus lives in a tension, that may feel at times like a dilemma, between what it draws from the development of modern humanism, and its attachment to the central mysteries of Christian faith." - act of faithful

iii. Roots of Violence

6. Where does violence come from - #1

(B) [no indication of a previous (A), unless Taylor is here responding to the "tragic" objections mentioned on p. 634]

parallel between the tensions of believers and unbelievers in this domain

657, "The question is this: how to understand certain powerful desires, sometimes even to the point of frenzy: wild sexuality, berserker rage, love of battle, slaughter? When we experience these, we are like wild beasts, we think. These desires are not only deeply unsettling, but also destructive. They militate against: benevolence, the binding of wounds, peace, goodness; and also long-lasting love, fidelity, bringing up children, caring. And of course, sanctity."

biological approach, cultural matrices, testosterone, . . .

660, "So not only our struggles to control unchained sexual desire and violence need to be understood in meta-biological terms: these "drives" themselves have to be grasped through the matrices of meaning which give them shape in our lives."

7. Counter-enlightenment and the Meaning of Violence

(660), These "want to rehabilitate the impulsions to violence, destruction, and orgiastic sexuality."

Georges Bataille – stages of the development of religion (664), "In place of the discredited faiths of the past, we have to find new forms of creative destruction to meet the deep need which religion has been striving to fulfill. . . . The attempts to train humans out of it, leave it behind us in the disciplines of civilization, are not only bound to fail, but also represent a mutilation of human life."

Cormac McCarthy and Robinson Jeffers

8. Christianity, Human Nature, and Violence

668, "But whether the propensity to violence is biological or metaphysical, this still leaves an enigma that any Christian understanding must explain: how can human nature as we know it be in the image of God?"

Story from fall, through Abraham revelation, through Christ – God's pedagogy

671, "We might see God as the supreme tennis player, who responds to our bad moves with new ways of countering them." yet . . .

671, "Does this Christian hermeneutic of violence offer a way out of the dilemmas of exclusive humanism? In a way, perhaps yes; in another way, no."

review Neitzsche and others

672, "But herein lies the difficulty. These explorations of the depth meaning of violence tend either to yield an affirmation, even glorification of it; or else to show how ineradicable it is. Put in other terms, we could say that they generally tend to show the draw to violence to be too deeply anchored to be rooted out, whether they rejoice in the prospect (Neitzsche) or take it with a resigned pessimism (Freud)."

Christianity opens a door to transformation – God's pedagogy

673-74, "This means that we have to respond on two levels to the resonances of violence in us. In the immediate context, we have to defend the innocent against attack. We had to fight the Nazis, end militia-driven civil wars, punish crimes against the person, silence calls to violence, and the like. This is all in the nature of damage control. //
    On another level, we have to think of how we can collaborate with God's pedagogy, help along the turning into the directions of God's plan." not denying meaning . . . good sections

674, "But a Christian perspective forbids us taking this kind of satisfying distance from it all. . . . helps awaken and legitimate the hostility and aggression in us, so that we are the more ready to believe and participate in our own kind of "holy" violence, even in a secular, liberal framework."

Christians face dilemmas

674, "If we take the two main axes of the critique of religion by unbelief, we find that, far from pointing to an evident answer, they rather show that both protagonists face profound difficulties and dilemmas, and indeed, of parallel kinds."

675, "But there is worse: in the context of the immanent frame, where so much turns on codes and structures, this inability to offer solutions is a painful predicament, which makes one feel inadequate and irrelevant to the great discussion. So that Christians are often induced to claim more than they should, and begin to offer "answers"; and in doing so, they fall into the same kind of blindness that reductive humanism suffers from."

both need realism

675, "Rather it appears as a matter of who can respond most profoundly and convincingly to what are ultimately commonly felt dilemmas."

Chapter 18 – Dilemmas 2

iv. Beyond Misanthropy and Violence? [playing with philanthropy and misanthropy a bit in this section and beyond?]

8. Setting the Stage: How We Respond to Suffering

Summary -
- culture under cross pressure
- views about our ethical predicaments are significant [listed in pp. 604-05]
- two rival attempts to struggle with dilemmas (transcendence or ordinary human desires; respect for roots of violence and moral demand to end it)
- reference points in modernity – allegiance to modern moral order (MMO) and human rights and/or promotion of the rehabilitation of body and desire

676, "We see from all this how ife in a secular age (in sense 3) is uneasy and cross-pressured, and doesn't lend itself easily to a comfortable resting place."

Reflections on Luc Ferry's recent exploration of "Le 'sens du sens'" [the meaning of meaning] and the unease with it all.
        More than ordinary ends? Merely horizontal? [fn 8; see Taylor's "A Catholic Modernity"]

678, "If we could get a clearer view of the lines of force which traverse this world, of the shape of spiritual experience within it, we would come closer to what I have been seeking here in this work, an understanding of what it is to live in an age of secularity 3."

678, "Raising the issue of meaning as Ferry does is a good place to start. It is indeed a feature of our age, unlike any previous ones, that we can feel the loss of meaning as a real threat."

can't die for "meaning," but can die for State, God . . .

679, "Just as my reading of the rise of modern secularity played off against a theory of epistemological primacy which underpinned the "death of God" scenario [p. 557ff]; so here the picture I want to offer of our present concerns and debates will conflict with certain popular general theories of religion. I mean by this, theories of what humans seek in religion." Not my own general theory, rather illumine the path.

680, "Having said this, I want to try to explore some of the spiritual hungers and tensions of secular modernity, as they become visible in light of the story I've been telling of its genesis."

1. (680) An answer to the problem of suffering and evil [Note – here Taylor prints a "1." The "2." appears on p. 711].

680, "When we break down the hunger for meaning into more concrete needs, one is for an answer to the problem of suffering and evil. I don't mean a theodicy; by definition, unbelievers have no place for this. I mean how to live with it."

681, "this is, as it were, a situation that arises even in a disenchanted world: we are unprotected; now not from demons and spirits, but from suffering and evil as we sense it raging in the world." - not just suffering but evil
- shut it out [Taylor calls this option "exclusion" later]
- do something about it (*tikkun olam*) – Hebrew for "healing the world"
various motives for acting and non-acting – theory and practical reasons (Bolshevik; post-Bolshevik abandonment of universal benevolence and the moral order of mutual benefit; Neitzsche; victim scenario)

684, "So we can see various forms of modern unbelief as powered by our recoil from suffering and evil."

685, the challenge reflection on suffering and evil poses to both sides
- Purified Christianity – being with suffering through the eyes of God and present with unbelieving solutions "there is perhaps a new, as yet untravelled road from them to God, a way of "making straight the way of the Lord"."
- A chastened, negative Liberalism "which has learned from the excesses of its own demonic potentiality."

10. On Violence and Religion (background found on pp. 374, 612, 639ff, 656ff)

685, "I will return in the next chapter to this question of the spiritual tensions of secular modernity, but for now I want to revert to the very incomplete discussion of the previous sections: what about violence and religion?"   - context of religious terrorism and atheist (Marx/Lenin) violence . . .

685, "The concern that I have been articulating above, how we live with evil, and avoid being engulfed by it, allows us to take further the discussion of religion and violence in section 5 above [where he was exploring the relationship between religion/Christianity and the "maximal demand": how to define our highest spiritual or moral aspirations for human beings, while showing a path to the transformation involved which doesn't crush, mutilate, or deny what is essential to our humanity? - Note, this again takes us further into the questions of how we assess our ethical predicament: the motivations which carry us toward or bar our way toward fullness; how this integral fullness may be achieved; whether the motivations that bar can or even should be vanquished or transformed; and would this effort to transform mutilate human life], and cast light on its [religion's] continued involvement with violence.

Background of religion and Christian resistance to violence.

- 685, "So how does sacred killing survive?" - in higher (post-Axial) religions [on this further see fn 15 and Taylor, "Notes on the Sources of Violence: Perennial and Modern" - his debt to Girard is clear here, though there are differences]

686, "But briefly put, the answer is that sacred killing recurs because it offers a form of purification."
Two formations convergence:
- identity through separation (purity)

- strength through identification with divine

686, "When they come together, the result is peculiarly powerful
- scapegoat mechanism
- Crusade

then from pre-Axial to Axial to modern

687, "So violence is now on a new footing. It is in the service of the Higher. And this means it can be all the more implacable, ruthless and thorough. Where much earlier warfare was ritualized, and hence limited, post-Axial sacred killing will become more and more rationalized and limitless.

This "progress" continues, because sacred killing not only survives, or reinvents itself after the Axial Revolution; it also does so after the modern secular Revolutions which were meant to sweep away "fanaticism", religious persecution, and Crusades; in short all the religiously-induced, senseless killing of the past."   French Revolution . . . "And when we move into the twentieth century, we can see a revolutionary violence, boosted by rational technology which dwarfs the horrors of all earlier ages."

[EBH – I need to cf. *Our Better Angels* here]

687, "In an important sense, the modern disengaged rational and secular world goes even farther in this direction than the religious civilization it rejected."

688, modern versions of scapegoat and identification with higher cause [cf. 686]. Thus, "all this can easily survive the rejection of religion."

689, "Post-Axial religions often suffer from a profound bad faith, even hypocrisy. But in this, they are not alone. They have been followed by some of the militant secular ideologies in this, as well as that hybrid phenomenon of our day, confessionally-defined nationalisms." use violence to affirm purity, yet deprive it of numinous depth . . . "The modern world, religious and secular, suffers from a deep rift in its self-understanding, an ideological blindness of massive proportions; something which is brilliantly anatomized by Chris Hedges in his harrowing book [fn 21, *War is a Force Which Gives Us Meaning*]

11. Clarifying the Dilemma: Reexamination of the Modern Moral Order

[on the characteristics of MMO cf. 170-71:
(1) Theory of rights and legitimate rule – political society as an instrument for something pre-political (agents)
(2) As instrument it serves mutual individual attainment of security and prosperity (life)
(3) Begins with free (buffered, disciplined) individuals – aim [as well as agency] is freedom
(4) Secured to all participants equally]

690, "Like all earlier notions of the moral basis of social order—like the orders of hierarchical complementarity, or ancient law—the modern idea of moral order tends to be seen by its adherents as self-stabilizing. That is, conformity to it lends cohesion to society, which becomes self-sustaining."

690, "A common view today is that the spread of free markets, liberal societies and democratic forms of rule will ensure golden age for humankind, promising universal peace and growing well-being for all." . . . (691), "But the sad record of continuing violence troubles this prospect. Why is it still with us?"   moral instability of rules; true but flaws in this idea
- allegiance to common good (not guaranteed by free market)

- "It seems we need a stronger ethic" (692) rewrite code, make tougher expectations of all?

692, "But we are all now painfully aware of the problems involved in this. Too great central control can undercut the prosperity that everyone desires, and can also threaten freedom."

altruism: possibilities and problems with this

693, "But here we are asking another question. Even though we have a defective account of what moves us, we may still be strongly motivated. People in fact agree on a politics of solidarity, or on humanitarian action, for a wide range of reasons; where one is an atheist humanist, another a Christian, another a Muslim, and so on. This is of the essence of a modern polity which operates on an "overlapping consensus". But within this, we can still ask which is more satisfactory as a basis, not now as an account of how it [the politics of consensus?] could come to exist, as in the earlier discussion, but rather as what I have called a "moral source". I mean by that considerations which (for us) inspire us to embrace this morality, and the evoking of which strengthens our commitment to it." [and here again he directly addresses questions (a) and (d) regarding approach to our ethical predicament – cf. pp. 604-05: there are motivations that can carry us forward. We can transcend, at least to some degree]

693, does reason for acting itself motivate or weaken? - critique of Hume and Kant, adding post-modern and anti-humanist critiques

695-96, "We could put the matter this way. Our age makes higher demands of solidarity and benevolence on people today than ever before. . . . // . . . How do we manage to do it?" as well as we do

1. part of what we understand as decent, civilized human life.
2. worth of others

yet negative side – in light of failures, are people really worthy

697, "The tragic irony is that the higher the sense of potential, the more grievously real people fall short, and the more severe the turn-around will be which is inspired by the disappointment."

"terribly naïve" humanism – (699), "In the end, the question becomes a maximin one: how to have the greatest degree of philanthropic action with the minimum hope in mankind."

699, "The reflections on the last paragraphs show how philanthropy, in actual service, can breed misanthropy." - misanthropy in modern literature

701, "How can we become agents on whom misanthropy has no hold, in whom it awakens no connivance?" Christian account – unconditional love or image of God

702-03, "Now one might conclude that this kind of response to the image of God in oth- // ers is not really a possibility for us humans, and one might not be able to make sense of this notion of our being given to each other. I think this can be real for us, but only to the extent that we open ourselves to God, which means in fact overstepping the limits set in theory be exclusive humanisms. If one does believe that, then one has something very important to say to modern times, something that addresses the fragility of what all of us, believer and unbeliever alike, most value in these times.

But if not, then it may appear that the awe-inspiring, Stoic courage of a Camus or a Derrida mut be our highest aspiration."   each requires "leap of faith" and anticipatory confidence . . . "But *if* the act of faith in God should be well-founded, then one must see this Stoic courage in a new light . . ." [cf. fn. 38]

12. Re-examining the Modern "Code"

in previous sections, had to get beyond code to motivation:
- section 10 - "how can we combat or overcome the temptation to shore up self-righteousness through scapegoating?"
- section 11 – how to find adequate moral sources for high standards of altruism

703, "In both cases, we went beyond the scope of much moral thinking which has emerged out of the modern conception of moral order. This has tended to focus precisely on codes, both moral codes, on one hand, and sets of institutions and rules, on the other." Interest, Rousseau and Kant on motivation – (704), "But contemporary thinking, even in its neo-Kantian forms, seems to have moved again away from this insight." - Taylor offers critique of current philosophical ethical dialogue

704, "What's wrong with this? Why can't our moral/ethical life ever be adequately captured in a code? Here are some of the reasons:"
1. The Aristotle reason: circumstances unforeseeably various
2. Plurality of goods – which can conflict
3. 2 intensifies 1 – (705), "So we need phronesis even more.
4. Two-dimensional space viewpoint – (706), "The horizontal space gives you the dimension in which you have to find the point of resolution, the fair "award" between two parties. The vertical space opens the possibility that by rising higher, you'll accede to a new horizontal space where the resolution will be less painful/damaging for both parties."

Examples of #4 in politics – Bosnia, Mandela, Tutu . . . (706), "The vertical dimension I've been talking about here is one of reconciliation and trust."   [EBH – engagement]

707, "But that means that there aren't any formulae for acting as Christians in the world. . . . clearly moving higher in the dimension of reconciliation and trust involves a kind of motivational conversion, and ability to forgo the satisfactions of retribution, or the security which comes from keeping a distrustful distance from the neighbour. It involves people bonding in a new way, whether this vertical path we are moving along is understood in a Christian way or not.
        So the "code fetishism", or nomolatry of modern liberal society is potentially very damaging. It tends to forget the background which makes sense of any code: the variety of goods which the rules and norms are meant to realize, and it tends to make us insensitive, even blind, to the vertical dimension. It also encourages a "one size fits all" approach: a rule is a rule. One might even say that modern nomolatry dumbs us down, orally and spiritually."

13. Application: Back to the Question of Violence

707, "Now this discussion surely has relevance to the issue we left in suspense at the end of section 10, that of scapegoating violence. Does all this tell us anything about how to lessen violence, or get rid of it? Have we a hope of doing this?"

affirmation and concern with Kant (ordered societies will be less violent)

708, any programme to overcome violence must contain:
- build ordered democratic polities
- spread benefits widely

yet problems with today – a third element?
- Recognize religious roots – yet problems with just "eliminating religion"

708, "This suggests another answer: all the above shows that the religious dimension is inescapable. Perhaps there is only the choice between good and bad religion." Girard, Buddha, Gospel. Yet problems

709, "So just believing in these"good" religions doesn't overcome the danger." . . . "There is no general remedy against this self-righteous reconstitution of the categorizations of violence, the lines drawn between the good and evil ones which permit the most terrible atrocities. But there can be moves, always within a given context, whereby someone renounces the right conferred by suffering, the right of the innocent to punish the guilty, of the victim to purge the victimizer. The move is the very opposite of the instinctive defense of our righteousness. It is a move which can be called forgiveness, but at a deeper level, it is based on a recognition of common, flawed humanity."

710, "It is this restoration of a common ground which defines the kind of move I am talking about." example of Mandela's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and other examples religious and non-religious   "It is in moves of this kind that we need to seek the third element [recognize religious roots] in our programme. They follow neither of the lines suggested above, in that, although they clearly derive a lot from the religious traditions involved, they are not necessarily the fruit of a personal religious faith. But however motivated, their power lies not in suppressing the madness of violent categorization, but in transfiguring it in the name of a new kind of common world."

Chapter 19 – Unquiet Frontiers of Modernity

Note – At chapter 18, Taylor began to talk about the unease of living in a cross-pressured secular age. He develops this (p. 677f with a discussion of Luc Ferry's idea of 'sens du sens' or the tensions we have toward meaning. Based on his identification of a kind of spiritual hunger in the midst of modernity, on p. 680 Taylor proceeds to "explore some of the spiritual hungers and tensions of secular modernity, as they become visible in the light of the story I've been telling of its genesis." We then find "1." which speaks of our hunger for an answer to the problem of evil. Now, on p. 711, we find "2." [and more]. Thus Taylor's structure is as follows:

- There is a hunger, an unease, with our modern space, which has to do with "the sources of deeper meaning in our lives" (711)
  - source #1 – our "aspiration to separate ourselves from evil and chaos, and to anchor ourselves in the good." (711)
  - source #2 – meanings of ordinary life [starting on p. 711]
  - source #3 – sense of time [starting on p. 712]
  - source #4 – in the face of death [starting on p. 720]

I think that Taylor here is developing his earlier discussion of the factors in our sense of the ethical predicament that affect our approach to the immanent frame: in particular, (a) motivations which carry

us toward fulfillment [note – later Taylor speaks of "moral sources which can enable us to live up to our very strong universal commitments"]. Taylor's "motivations," I think, are also the "moral sources," or the "sources of deeper meaning." Thus, our common human aspiration to separate ourselves from evil, our appreciation for the ordinary, our sense of time, and our confrontation with death all are elements which together can cooperate to help form a way forward in a secular age.

14. More On Spiritual Hunger and the Sources of Meaning: Ordinary Life, and Time

711, "I'd like to return now to Ferry's meta-question about "le sens du sens", the sources of deeper meaning in our lives. . . . I want now to mention a few other sources of meaning, or domains of life in which we seek such sources. This examination cannot decide the issue between belief and unbelief, any more than the discussion of the previous sections did. But it can bring into view certain sites of unease with the closed perspective."

2. [ordinary life]
711, "Let's look at another way to answer Ferry's question: we could try to show how deep and powerful are the meanings of ordinary life, the satisfactions of love, of work, the enjoyment of the natural world, the riches of music, literature, art."

constantly seems to transgress the limits of the natural-human domain – simple perception vs. profound and deep feelings. What's there?

3. [sense of time]
review of secular time treatment and how public sphere, economy, and democratic state depend on view of time - "central modern forms of society" - modern time with no "high points"

yet national cycles and events and moments (716), "But if the once-for-all has to be repeated to remain alive, it is also true that the cycles depend on the once-for-all for their meaning and force."

Importance of narratives, modern horizontal narratives that are now coming under attack – so now what about the routines?

718, "But unsupported by a believable narrative, or by other earlier conceptions of order, the disci;lined routines of everyday life in civilization become highly problematic." (prison, failed integration through unemployment and such, don't give unity)

719, "That the repeatable cycles of life connect over time, and make a continuity, is an essential condition of a life having meaning. Just this kind of connection was assured by earlier modes of gathering in the eternal; as it is also provided by strong modern narratives of self-realization. But where the credibility and force of these narratives weaken, the unity comes under threat."

15. More On Spiritual Hunger and the Sources of Meaning: Facing Death

4. [facing death]
720, "The above are just some of the ways in which our modern time-experience responds to the recession of higher times. To enumerate them all would require a much more wide-ranging study of contemporary culture, and in particular, our stances toward death. But together they perhaps give us cause to speak of a "désir d' éternité" in human beings [cf. Fn 7], a desire to gather together the

scattered moments of meaning into some kind of whole. And maybe this emerges in another way as well, in face of death."

Comments on Neitzsche's "Alle Lust will Ewigkeit" - (721), "Rather, all joy strives for eternity, because it loses some of its sense if it doesn't last."

722, "Now all this doesn't show that the faith perspective is correct. It just shows that the yearning for eternity is not the trivial and childish thing it is painted as." - cross pressure
   • what we have lived for
   • what we hold on to

726, "This paradoxical idea, which we could call immanent transcendence, is one of the principal themes of the immanent counter-Enlightenment. Death offers in some sense the privileged perspective, the paradigm gathering point for life." [on this further see fn 16 and Taylor's "Immanent Counter-Enlightenment"]

16. Summary

Review (726), "My aim in the last pages has been to raise a number of ways in which our modern culture is restless at the barriers of the human sphere. I have mentioned: the search for meaning, the deepening of our sense of life through our contact with nature and art, death as a denial of the significance of love, but also death as an escape from the confines of life, to the paramount vantage point in which life shows meaning." [Taylor also mentioned our sense of time, but does not mention it here in his summary]

726-27, "Before [in previous chapters and sections] I dealt with a number of dilemmas and demands which both faith and exclusive humanism have to deal with. These demands include: finding the moral sources which can enable us to live up to our very strong universal commitments to human rights and well being; and finding how to avoid the turn to violence which returns uncannily and often unnoticed in the "higher" forms of life which have supposedly set it aside definitively. Rather than one side clearly possessing the answers // that the other one lacks, we find rather that both face the same issues, and each with some difficulty."

727, " . . . I hope that the basic point has been made more plausible: the present fractured expressivist culture, with its advancing post-Durkheimiam understanding, seems very inhospitable to belief." ideologically fragmented, massive unlearning

727, "All this is true, and yet the sense that there is something more presses in. . . . . Such are the strange and complex conditions of belief in our age."

Chapter 20 – Conversions

1. Breaking Out of the Immanent

728, "In the last chapter, I was trying to describe the contemporary debate, largely through examining unbelieving positions, and their critiques of religion. But here I want to get another perspective on this debate, and look briefly at some of those who broke out of the immanent frame; people who went through some kind of "conversion".

[1] Self-Authenticating "epiphanic" experience

Bede Griffiths [in chapter 1]
Vaclav Havel (and also Francis of Assisi . . .) - experience of fullness
also experience of love

brief discussion of "experience" individual and collective
Buddha, Walker Percy, Dostoyevsky

732, "The convert's insights break beyond the limits of the regnant versions of immanent order, either in terms of accepted theories, or of moral and political practice (and you need to go beyond both at once in order to raise the issues about the roots of violence I raised in the preceding chapter). And this may require her to invent a new language or literary style. She breaks from the immanent order to a larger, more encompassing one, which include it while disrupting it."

Strands coming together related to culture and Christianity:
• Deepest sources of culture in Christianity and culture lose of lose Christianity (Dawson and Eliot)
• Error of modernism in subjectivism (Eliot and epecially Maritain)
• Christianity essential for order (thus the modern world creeping into disorder)

backward look (needs and problems) and the two orders (earthly city and city of God) and their demands – how to reconcile?

735-36, "If one carries this rapprochement of the two orders to its ultimate end point, one // falls into a kind of Deism, in which the Incarnation loses its significance . . ."

Conclusion – his point: (736-37), "In other words, the ideal of Christendom has tended to evolve since the age of // Dante. Then there was a strong sense of the gap and inescapable tension between the ultimate order of the Parousia, which is in gestation today, on one hand, and the established order of civilization as we live it, on the other. In many Christian milieux in modern times, that gap has narrowed, and the tensions lost sight of."

2. Christianity and Culture: Reflections on Ivan Illich and Beyond

Is the disappearance of this gap in modernity a loss?

Yes -
[1] Lose sight of the transformation that Christian faith offers

[2] Mere code is shallow

737, "Secondly, as Ivan Illich has so forcefull argued, something is lost when we take away the way of living together that the Gospel point us to and make of it a code of rules enforced by organizations erected for this purpose. I want to follow Illich's argument more fully, because as should become evident, his story is quite close to the one I have been trying to tell in these pages indeed I have learned a lot from him." [Interesting to compare his summary of Illich with the larger narrative of the pages of this book and Taylor's entire corpus]

Illich, priest who became more radicalized – Then, for the next few pages Taylor summarizes Illich's position presented in *The Testament of Ivan Illich*

737, "Seen within the history of Western civilization, the present-day welfare state can be understood as the long-term heir to the early Church" [EBH – and, following Peter Brown's *Through the Eye of the Needle*, we could also argue that to some extent, the early Church's welfare program, at least from the sixth-century forward, was heir to the Roman welfare state]

Illich has problems with the institutional expression as a betrayal of the Christian message (738), "What the story [Good Samaritan, gospel] is opening for us is not a set of universal rules, applying anywhere and everywhere, but another way of being. This involves on one hand a new motivation, and on the other, a new kind of community."

739, a network, not a categorical grouping . . . "But the really terrible corruption is a kind of falling forward, in which the church develops into something unprecedented. The network of agape involves a kind of fidelity to the new relations; and because we can all too easily fall away from this (which falling away we call "sin"), we are led to shore up these relations; we institutionalize them, introduce rules, divide responsibilities. In this way, we keep the hungry fed, the homeless housed, the naked clothed; but we are now living caricatures of the network life. We have lost some of the communion, the "conspiratio", which is at the heart of the Eucharist (chapter 20). The spirit is strangled."

740, "For Illich, there is something monstrous, alienating about this way of life. The monstrous comes from a corruption of the highest agape-network. Corrupted Christianity gives rise to the modern."

741, "We can see that Illich's story is not just about Christianity, but also about modern civilization."

742, "This civilization has pushed to its farthest limits the move which Illich describes as the corrupting of Christianity: that is, in response to the failure and inadequacy of a motivation grounded in a sense of mutual belonging, it erects a system. This incorporates (a) a code or set of rules, (b) a set of disciplines which make us internalize these rules, (c) a system of rationally constructed organizations (private or public bureaucracies, universities, schools) to make sure that we carry out what the rules demand. All these become second nature to us, including the decentring [sic] from our lived experience which we have to carry through in order to become disciplined, rational, disengaged subjects. From within this perspective, the standard account of the Good Samaritan story appears just obvious: it is a stage on the road to a universal morality of rules."

Illich radical – (743), "But even if we can't fully escape the nomocratic-judicialized-objectified world, it is terribly important to see that that is not all there is, that it is in many ways dehumanizing, alienating; that it often generates dilemmas that it cannot see, and in driving forward, acts with great ruthlessness and cruelty." [EBH – some of this requires simply be a reflection on what I call "scale" and the transformation of individual and community virtues as scale increases]

743, "Illich can remind us not to become totally invested in the code, even the best code of a peace-loving, egalitarian, liberalism. We should find the centre of our spiritual lives beyond the code, deeper than the code, in networks of living concern, which are not to be sacrificed to the code, which must even from time to time subvert it."

Papal condemnation of Action Française in 1926, perceiving danger here. Maritain's break with Maurras. (744), "Rather he [Maritain] sought a unity of Christian culture on a global scale, but in a

dispersed network of Christian lay institutions and centres of intellectual and spiritual life." (cf. *Humanisme Intégral*)

3. Itineraries to the Faith – Péguy

Things are out of order -
- return to real Christendom (past)
- problem in human condition itself – some take the position of modern civilization's "loyal opposition" (745)

critical distance from the "least bad civilization so far" - and different approaches to this.
745, "These different approaches, out of different embeddings, we can call "itineraries" to the Faith."

example of Charles Péguy – rejecting excarnation, building on Bergson's understanding of time and "memory"

747, "A crucial distinction for Péguy lay between a life dominated by fixed habits, and one in which one could creatively renew oneself, even against the force of acquired and rigidified forms. . . . . A crucial concept for Péguy was *fidélité*, a faithfulness to the tradition which precisely excluded just going back. Going back was a betrayal, because it replaced a creative continuation of the past with a mechanical reproduction of it."

748, "Tout commence en mystique et finit en politique"

[First] – Péguy's return to faith was partly a response to this very distressing insight

(749), "Secondly, . . . plurality of mystiques which have inspired human beings"
"third point . . . a "cité harmonieuse" which "incoporates the aim of a loyal co-operation between the defenders of such ideals, honest about their disagreements, but never having recourse to force or exclusion. This is how Péguy himself lived with his diverse circle of friends."
"Fourthly, no place for Hell."

751, [Taylor translating Péguy here], "One is not a Christian because one is at a certain moral, intellectual, or even spiritual level. One is a Christian because one belongs to a race *which is re-ascending,* to a certain mystical race that is spiritual and carnal, temporal and eternal, in other words, because one is of a certain *blood.*" spiritual always incarnate . . . "his Christian faith is animated by his profound rejection of modern excarnation. This is, as it were, the path by which he rejoins the faith of the Incarnation."

4. Response to Péguy and Vatican II

One framework - Who's right?

752, "The second framework in which we can understand this kind of study postulates that what is at stake is complementary insights." (753), "We have to grasp these historical differences bi-focally." [Here Taylor is presenting a similar approach to what he described earlier as a two-dimensional view]

754, "Neither of us grasps the whole picture. Together we can live it more fully than any one of us could alone." [EBH – C. S. Peirce and contrite fallibilism] . . . "our faith is not the acme of Christianity,

but nor is it a degenerate version; it should rather be open to a conversation that ranges over the whole of the last 20 centuries (and even in some ways before)."

Communion of Saints – whole ininerary

755, "It is that the Church, as a communion of different peoples and ages, in mutual understanding and enrichment, is damaged, limited, and divided by an unfounded total belief in one's own truth, which really better deserves the name of heresy."

5. Symbol, Language and Hopkins

pioneers abound of new itineraries

755, "But I should like to discuss briefly one other major figure, Gerard Manley Hopkins."

modern, post-Romantic, performative understanding of language
Treatment of doctrine of the symbol, poetry as performative event – opening up something new

poetry vs. kitsch

760, " . . . the resonances which matter are those which link speaker and hearer, writer and readers, and eventually whole communities."

Three issues (no, four):
- need for the restitution of the constitutive power of language
- thus instrumental use while deeper meanings are neglected
- lost the power to Name things within their embedding in deeper/higher reality
- our lives are reduced

cf. Scotus and "thisness" (*haecceitas*)

(762), "A thing can have its particular being only in relation to God." . . . (763), "We can never know God. . . . But we can have a sense of him in his creation;"

6. On Interpretive Frameworks

765, "I have spent a great deal of time on literary figures in this chapter, but the gamut of new itineraries is much wider than this. There are also those who have found new paths of prayer or action, like Charles de Foucauld, John maine, Jean Vanier, Mother Teresa, and Thérèse de Lisieux, to name just a few." [notice the reference to Certeau in fn 64]

What to make of this?
- Continuity with Faith
- digressions are what is important, therefore relegate tradition to partly erroneous foreshadowing

either of these options postulates single option – which is "right"?   (765), "I hope I have contributed a little in this discussion to making clear how much is lost in this perspective, the rich variety of paths to God which it negates or casts into shadow." . . .

765-77, ""But this full variety can only come to light if we adopt the other framework, and see the unity of the church as stretching into eternity across all // time, such that the paradigm itineraries that it gathers can't be identified with those of any one age." [note citation in fn 65]

tensions in practicing this ideal – constant of interpretive frameworks in tension – example of sexual ethics

7. Possible Futures

767, "Having wisely noted in several places in this book the impossibility of prediction, I cannot stop myself from speculating nevertheless." - two alternative futures

One future – mainline secularization theory: religion shrinking further and further

I foresee another future – conversion of both believers and unbelievers to a dangerous faith, different in different societies

770, "But its general structure would be this: whatever the equilibrium point which dominates in any milieu, it will always be fragile." some inward, others outward

religious past cannot simply be abandoned – something genuinely important and valuable in it

learn from modernity – can't simply marginalize it as a Christian-Stoic

771, "It's not that I'm trying to say that Christianity, for instance, is inferior to paganism in that, whatever else it has, it lacks the full sense of embodiment of the earlier forms it displaced. Rather I am saying that Christianity, as the faith of the Incarnate God, is denying something essential to itself as long as it remains wedded to forms which excarnate."

another negative feature – tendency to homogenize

772, "The point is, once more, not that we need to leaven Christianity with a dose of paganism, but that our Christian life itself has suffered a mutilation to the extent that it imposes this kind of homogenization. The church was rather meant to be the place in which human beings, in all their difference and disparate itineraries, come together; and in this regard, we are obviously falling far short."

God's pedagogy problematic at times

Epilogue: The Many Stories

773, "I would like to situate my story of Western "secularization" uin relation to other historical accounts, which trace the changes in philosophical or theological outlook or theory that ended up producing our present predicament."   different, but not conflict-f

- Critique of medieval "realism" and the rise of nominalism . . . . create essential background of modern secular thought (Rèmi Brague, John Milbank) – The Intellectual Deviation theory (ID)
- Importance of Reform interest (Charles Taylor) – The Reform Master Narrative theory (RMN)

distinctions regarding what each of these theories covers. ID not enough by itself, though well addresses one area.

775, "I would see our two stories, ID and RMN, as complementary, exploring different sides of the same mountain, or the same winding river of history."

775-76, " . . . could we not just fix the // contemporary situation in terms of the deviations identified in ID? But history cannot be separated from the situation it has brought about. . . . Thus we need both ID and RMN to explain religion today."